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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 In Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 
(1996), this Court held that where Congress had 
imposed “elaborate enforcement provisions” in one 
statute allowing for monetary awards, Congressional 
authorization for mere injunctions in a different 
statute did not include monetary relief. Years later, 
this Court denied the Government’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari after the District of Columbia 
Circuit applied Meghrig by holding that an 
injunction section of the RICO Act did not permit a 
disgorgement remedy since RICO provided elaborate 
enforcement provisions elsewhere for such relief. See 
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 
1190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 960 (2005). 
 The question presented here is whether, 
following Meghrig, the presence of elaborate 
enforcement provisions authorizing monetary relief 
under Section 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b, 
precludes interpreting monetary remedies into the 
purely injunctive language of Section 13(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 53(b). 
 ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
 
Kristy Ross, an individual, is the Petitioner. 
The United States Federal Trade Commission is the 
Respondent. 
 iii
RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
STATEMENT 
 
Not applicable. 
 
Parties and individuals who are no longer 
participating in this matter (having defaulted or 
settled) are: 
 
INNOVATIVE MARKETING, INC., d/b/a 
Winsolutions FZ-LLC, d/b/a Billingnow, d/b/a 
Winpayment Consultancy SPC, d/b/a BillPlanet PTE 
Ltd., d/b/a Revenue Response Sunwell, d/b/a 
Globedat, d/b/a Winsecure Solutions, d/b/a Synergy 
Software BV, d/b/a Innovative Marketing Ukraine; 
BYTEHOSTING INTERNET SERVICES, LLC; 
JAMES RENO, d/b/a Setupahost.net, individually, 
and as an officer of ByteHosting Internet Services, 
LLC; SAM JAIN, individually and as an officer of 
Innovative Marketing, Inc.; DANIEL SUNDIN, d/b/a 
Vantage Software, d/b/a Winsoftware, Ltd., 
individually and as an officer of Innovative 
Marketing, Inc.; MARC D’SOUZA, d/b/a Web 
Integrated Net Solutions, individually and as an 
officer of Innovative Marketing, Inc.; MAURICE 
D’SOUZA. 
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 
 Petitioner Kristy Ross respectfully petitions 
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, insofar as it allowed the award of monetary 
remedies under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
 
 The opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (App. at 1a-16a) is 
reported at 743 F.3d 886. The findings and 
conclusions of the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland (App. at 17a-53a) are 
reported at 897 F. Supp. 2d 369. 
 
JURISDICTION 
 
 The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion and 
judgment on February 25, 2014. This Petition is thus 
timely. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 
1254(1). 
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STATUTORY AND REGULATORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act states in 
pertinent part: “a temporary restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction may be granted without 
bond,” and “[in] proper cases the Commission may 
seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a 
permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
Section 19(b) of the FTC Act states in 
pertinent part: 
 
The court in an action under subsection 
(a) of this section shall have jurisdiction 
to grant such relief as the court finds 
necessary to redress injury to 
consumers or other persons, 
partnerships, and corporations 
resulting from the rule violation or the 
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as 
the case may be. Such relief may 
include, but shall not be limited to, 
rescission or reformation of contracts, 
the refund of money or return of 
property, the payment of damages, and 
public notification respecting the rule 
violation or the unfair or deceptive act 
or practice, as the case may be . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).  
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
This case presents a rare chance to review a 
nonstatutory Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
strategy that, by the FTC’s own admission, resulted 
in over 300 FTC complaint-filings and over $2 billion 
in consent- and litigated-judgments in the past six 
years alone. (App. at 54a). Just last year, a former 
Chair of the FTC published a scholarly analysis of 
this strategy and criticized its lack of an appropriate 
legal basis.1 Commentators have widely criticized the 
strategy as one that exceeds the FTC’s statutory 
authority and coerces settlements by individuals and 
businesses alike.2 The strategy, therefore, dissuades 
those with the greatest interest in this Court’s 
review from seeking its elimination. Though several 
circuit courts have given their imprimatur to it over 
the past 30 years, this case is apparently the first 
after Meghrig v. KFC Western, 516 U.S. 479 (1996), 
to bring the FTC’s overreaching before this Court for 
review. 
                                                 
1 J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Striking 
the Proper Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of 
the FTC Act, 79 Antitrust L.J. 1, 26 (2013) (hereafter, 
“Beales & Muris”) (“[Section 19’s] enactment 
suggests that no such [consumer redress] authority 
was ever granted [in Section 13(b)].”). 
2 Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions or 
Congressional Intentions?, 41 Am. U.L. Rev. 1139, 
1191-92 (1992) (“[T]he finding that section 13(b) 
permits an unrestricted means of restitution creates 
such a conflict with section 19 that an ‘inescapable 
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The issue is now as fully percolated as it is 
likely to be. The Fourth Circuit in this case found 
Petitioner’s arguments seeking to end the FTC’s 
overreaching “not entirely unpersuasive,” yet gave 
them no effect out of a stated reluctance to create a 
circuit split. (App. at 7a-8a). With such circuit court 
reasoning, it becomes increasingly unlikely that any 
future circuit court will be willing to rein in FTC 
illegality and overreaching.  
In short, courts have allowed the FTC to read 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to seek monetary 
remedies in consumer protection cases, when that 
Section only contains express authorization for 
                                                                                                    
inference’ arises that the power to grant permanent 
injunctions under section 13(b) does not include the 
power to grant redress to consumers injured by the 
conduct giving rise to the injunction when the 
requirements of section 19 have not been satisfied.”); 
see also George P. Roach, Counter-Restitution for 
Monetary Remedies in Equity, 68 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 
1271, 1309 (2011) (“[A] defendant might readily 
settle for an injunction and a moderate monetary 
award rather than face the prospect of defending a 
claim for a large claim for gross disgorgement in a 
district court that has previously agreed to follow the 
FTC’s aggressive theory of monetary damages in 
equity.”); Michael Thurman & Michael L. Mallow, 
“Hid[ing] Elephants in Mouseholes”: the FTC’s 
Unwarranted Attempt to Regulate the Debt-Relief-
Services Industry Using Rulemaking Authority 
Purportedly Granted by the Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,” 14 Tex. 
Rev. L. & Pol. 301, 305-15 (2010). 
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injunctions. Injunctions already protect the public 
from unfair or deceptive practices. Congress put 
thoughtful restraints on FTC efforts to seek 
monetary relief. Section 19 recites those restraints, 
which the FTC evades each time it seeks monetary 
remedies under Section 13(b) alone.3 
This Court’s precedents, discussed below, 
require first discerning the statutory purpose of the 
enactments in question. 
 
I. Congress Inserted Injunctions into One 
FTC Act Section, and Monetary Remedies into 
Another 
 
Congress added Section 13(b) to the FTC Act 
as part of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline 
Authorization Act of 1973. P.L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 
592 (1973). This section was added primarily as a 
bandage, allowing the FTC to enjoin defendants’ 
deceptive practices pending an administrative 
proceeding. See Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 6-21 
(containing an extensive discussion of statutory 
purpose and history of the FTC Act and its 
amendments). Prior to this, a defendant could 
                                                 
3 Reporting on the Fourth Circuit decision here, the 
National Law Journal described this dispute as 
“high-stakes,” since the lower court’s adoption of the 
FTC’s arguments meant that “a key part in [its] 
‘arsenal’ . . . [escaped a] potentially devastating 
challenge.” See Jenna Greene, Court Lets FTC Keep 
Its Big Gun, Nat’l L.J. (March 3, 2014). No one can 
debate the national importance of this issue. 
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continue to injure consumers before an FTC internal 
“cease and desist order” proceeding concluded.  
 Both the legislative history and the larger 
statutory scheme confirm the limited purpose of this 
amendment. A Senate Report addressing what was 
to become Section 13(b) stated: 
 
The purpose of [Section 13(b)] is to 
permit the Commission to bring an 
immediate halt to unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices when to do so would be 
in the public interest. At the present 
time such practices might continue for 
several years until agency action is 
completed. Victimization of American 
consumers should not be so shielded. 
[Section 13(b)] authorizes the granting 
of a temporary restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction without bond 
pending the issuance of a complaint by 
the Commission under Section 5 . . . . 
 
S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 30-31 (1973) (emphasis 
added).4 In the House discussion on Section 13(b), 
Representative Smith noted that “[i]t is only good 
sense that where there is a probability that the act 
will eventually be found illegal and the perpetrator 
                                                 
4 Although Section 13(b) was passed as part of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act in 1973, it 
was originally introduced as part of and was 
discussed in the legislative history of the Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act. P.L. No. 93-
637, 88 Stat. 2201 (1975).  
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ordered to cease, that some method be available to 
protect innocent third parties while the litigation 
winds its way through final decision.” 119 Cong. Rec. 
36608-9 (Nov. 12, 1973). Furthermore, a 1974 House 
Report, written just after passage of Section 13(b), 
set out the purpose of the amendment:  
 
Both the Nader and ABA reports 
recommended that the FTC be 
empowered to obtain preliminary 
injunctions against unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices which are unfair or 
deceptive to consumers. This authority 
was granted by Section 408 of the 
Alaska Pipeline Act [Section 13(b)] . . . . 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, at 7716 (1974).  
Former FTC Chair Timothy J. Muris, in his 
scholarly writing, recently criticized courts for 
ignoring the “rich and nuanced debate that produced 
the 1970’s amendments to the FTC Act,” concluding 
that “[n]either the FTC nor Congress thought that 
the changes to Section 13 solved the FTC’s need for 
greater remedial authority, which led to the passage 
of Sections 19 and 5(m)(1)(B) in 1975.” Beales & 
Muris, supra n.1, at 6. He notes that “[w]hat little 
debate there was evinces no indication that anyone 
understood the [Section 13(b)] provision to do 
anything other than confer on the agency the 
authority to seek injunctive relief to end practices 
while administrative proceedings were on-going.” Id. 
at 14-15. The FTC on its own accord decided to read 
this interpretation into the statute years later. Id. at 
22-28.   
 8
Chair Muris notes that “if Section 13(b) 
allowed the FTC to go into court to seek consumer 
redress routinely, the FTC could have used Section 
13(b) with or without the issuance of a cease-and-
desist order.” Id. at 17. “Tellingly, the debate over 
redress did not stop.” Id. at 16.  
In 1975, only two years after the passage of 
Section 13(b), Congress amended the FTC Act to 
include Section 19.5 This Section permits the FTC to 
bring civil actions against parties only after it has 
gone through the administrative process and issued 
a final cease-and-desist letter. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). 
While the relief granted in Section 13(b) cases is 
limited to injunctions, Section 19(b) (repeated here) 
explicitly includes monetary relief: 
 
The court in an action under subsection 
(a) of this section shall have jurisdiction 
to grant such relief as the court finds 
necessary to redress injury to 
consumers or other persons, 
                                                 
5 Both Sections 13(b) and 19(b) were originally 
introduced during the same session of Congress. See 
S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 27-31 (Origins of Section 19(b) 
introduced as “Consumer Redress (section 203),” and 
origins of Section 13(b) introduced as “Injunctions 
(section 210)”). Section 19(b) was passed in 1975 as 
part of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act. P.L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). However, 
the fact that both Sections were originally 
contemplated together provides additional evidence 
that Sections 13(b) and 19(b) were meant to address 
separate issues. 
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partnerships, and corporations 
resulting from the rule violation or the 
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as 
the case may be. Such relief may 
include, but shall not be limited to, 
rescission or reformation of contracts, 
the refund of money or return of 
property, the payment of damages, and 
public notification respecting the rule 
violation or the unfair or deceptive act 
or practice, as the case may be . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (emphasis added). The difference 
in wording between Sections 13(b) and 19(b) is clear. 
Section 13(b) lays out an exhaustive list limiting 
relief to temporary restraining orders, preliminary 
injunctions, and permanent injunctions. 15 U.S.C. § 
53(b). Section 19(b), in contrast, provides a non-
exhaustive list (“such relief may include, but shall not 
be limited to”) that explicitly permits the FTC to seek 
monetary relief. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).  
 “During debates in both the Senate and the 
House, the members of Congress who spoke on the 
floor again seemed to be of the view that Section 19 
was giving the FTC significant, new authority.” 
Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 19-20. Their conduct in 
enacting Section 19 suggests that members of 
Congress were ignorant of the possibility that 
Section 13 (which the same Congress had just 
recently passed) already gave the FTC broad redress 
authority. Id. at 20. This and the rest of the 
“legislative history, viewed in its entirety, provides 
the ‘inescapable inference’ that Congress did not 
 10
intend the injunctive relief provision to swallow the 
monetary relief provision.” Id. at 21. 
  
II. The Multi-Decade Evolution of the FTC’s 
Strategy to Use Section 13(b) to Seek Monetary 
Remedies 
 
 At first, the FTC did not seek monetary 
remedies under Section 13(b). But in the early 
1980’s, the FTC developed what it termed the 
“Section 13(b) Fraud Program.” Id. at 22-23. The 
Fraud Program started by convincing the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits that the “preliminary injunction” 
language of Section 13(b) permitted an asset freeze 
at the outset of litigation. Id. However, even 
acquiring Section 13(b) asset freeze powers was not 
enough from the FTC’s perspective. The FTC 
perceived that it would be a “clunky, multi-step 
process” to use three different actions against 
defendants: first, a Section 13(b) asset freeze in 
court; second, a Section 19 proceeding in the FTC to 
obtain a cease-and-desist order; and third, years 
later, a Section 19 court action to seek consumer 
redress. Id. The FTC thus began to rely on this 
Court’s precedent, Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 
U.S. 395 (1946), to argue for monetary remedies as 
part of the inherent equitable powers “presumed” to 
reside within the enactment of Section 13(b). Id. at 
24-25. This use of Section 13(b) avoided the 
inconvenience to the FTC of respecting 
Congressional limitations on FTC power inserted 
into Section 19: a statute of limitations, a causation 
requirement, and a prior cease-and-desist order 
requirement. 
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 But as discussed in more detail below, “Porter 
made clear that Congress need not grant the courts 
full equitable jurisdiction if doing so would be 
inconsistent with Congress’s intended statutory 
scheme.” Id. at 25. Meghrig v. KFC Western, also 
discussed below, solidifies this conclusion. Thus, the 
analysis required by Porter and its progeny ought to 
have required the FTC and its chosen courts to 
discern Congressional intent. Id. Yet, courts allowing 
the FTC its desired Section 13(b) scope “have not 
considered the legislative history of Section 13(b) and 
the 1975 amendments to the FTC Act.” Id. at 26. Nor 
have they properly considered the manifestation of 
Congressional intent embodied in the respective 
1973 and 1975 enactments themselves. 
  
III. The District Court Proceedings 
 
The FTC brought this case on December 2, 
2008, alleging a scheme to “exploit[] consumers’ 
legitimate concerns about Internet-based threats like 
spyware and viruses by issuing false security or 
privacy warnings to consumers for the sole purpose 
of selling software to fix the imagined problem.” 
(Complaint ¶15). The Complaint alleged a “common 
enterprise” among several corporate entities, 
including Innovative Marketing, Inc. (Complaint ¶7). 
The FTC also named Petitioner Kristy Ross, the 
company’s one-time Vice President of Business 
Development.  
The Complaint alleged violations of Section 
5(a) (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)), and asserted the FTC’s 
power as a federal agency to bring a court action 
solely under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. 
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§ 53(b)). (Complaint ¶1; App. at 17a). The FTC had 
not commenced an administrative complaint within 
the FTC that might have led to a cease-and-desist 
order under Section 5(b) (15 U.S.C. § 45(b)). Thus, 
the FTC had done nothing that might trigger a 
possibility of consumer redress under Section 19.  
After several persons and entities defaulted, 
the district court entered default judgments on 
February 24, 2009. Judgment was not entered 
against Petitioner Ross, who by then had appeared to 
defend and clear her name. Eventually, all co-
defendants who had not defaulted settled with the 
FTC, except for Petitioner Ross.  
The district court denied an FTC summary 
judgment motion and set the matter for trial. A two-
day bench trial commenced on September 11, 2012. 
As a consequence of prior court rulings, Ms. Ross was 
precluded from presenting evidence of non-
deceptiveness. Only a single witness testified in 
person, a witness who had never met or spoken to 
Ms. Ross. Testimony took up only eighteen of the 242 
pages of trial transcript, mostly to authenticate a 
document for the FTC. Most of the trial consisted of 
opening statements and closing arguments (the other 
224 pages).  
On September 24, 2012, the district court 
issued its judgment, along with its memorandum 
opinion containing findings and conclusions. The 
district court found Ms. Ross liable under Section 
13(b) for the same $163 million in monetary 
remedies as in the default judgments, and issued a 
permanent injunction against her involvement in 
computer security software. (App. at 50a-53a). The 
FTC immediately issued a press release boasting of 
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the $163 million judgment. See Press Release, 
Federal Trade Commission, FTC Case Results in 
$163 Million Judgment against “Scareware” 
Marketer (Oct. 2, 2012) (Published by the FTC at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/10/winfixer.shtm, last 
visited May 16, 2014). An appeal followed. 
 
IV. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision 
 
 Ms. Ross presented five grounds for reversal, 
only one of which is addressed in this Petition.6  
 The Fourth Circuit agreed with Petitioner 
Ross that Section 13(b)’s statutory “text does not 
expressly authorize the award of consumer redress.” 
(App. at 5a). It went on, however, to analyze the 
scope of the court’s equitable jurisdiction in light of 
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) 
and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 
U.S. 288 (1960). (App. at 5a). 
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit failed to 
acknowledge that Porter compels that unstated 
equity remedies do not exist when there is a 
“necessary and inescapable inference” that Congress 
did not grant the full scope of equity jurisdiction. 
Porter, 328 U.S. at 397-98. Nor did the Fourth 
Circuit acknowledge that Mitchell restated this 
                                                 
6 Petitioner Ross does not directly petition for review 
of the Fourth Circuit’s decision on the standard for 
individual monetary liability, though it, too, is 
entirely absent from the plain words of the FTC Act.  
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principle.7 Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291. Instead, the 
Fourth Circuit quoted out of context Porter’s 
statement that the “comprehensiveness of this 
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in 
the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command.” (App. at 5a). Under this seemingly higher 
standard, the Fourth Circuit searched for a such a 
“command,” and claimed that it found none. (App. at 
5a-7a). However, Porter defined how such a 
“command” may be embodied – as a “necessary and 
inescapable inference” (328 U.S. at 398) revealed 
through statutory purpose (328 U.S. at 400). 
The Fourth Circuit also claimed that 
Petitioner Ross failed to present “some 
countervailing indication sufficient to rebut the 
presumption” that monetary consumer redress is 
allowed under Section 13(b). (App. at 5a). Instead, 
the Fourth Circuit created a straw man to represent 
Petitioner Ross’s argument. The Fourth Circuit 
labored under the misimpression that Petitioner 
Ross was arguing that the absence of Porter’s “other 
order” language sealed the outcome here. The Fourth 
Circuit thus held that the absence of “magic words” 
that had permitted full equitable remedies in Porter 
(namely, the text “other order” after text about 
injunctions) did not suffice. (App. at 6a). The problem 
is, that was not Petitioner Ross’s argument (as 
shown below). 
                                                 
7 Though Petitioner Ross cited and applied Meghrig 
v. KFC Western prominently in her briefing, the 
Fourth Circuit ignored that decision as well. 
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The Fourth Circuit proceeded to declare that 
this Court in Mitchell “significantly expanded 
Porter’s holding.” (App. at 6a). As perceived by the 
Fourth Circuit, even though the “other order” 
language from Porter was absent in Mitchell, “the 
Court held that ordering reimbursement was 
nevertheless permissible under Porter.” (App. at 7a). 
In so doing, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize 
how Mitchell actually clarified Porter. The Fourth 
Circuit decision appears to overlook that Mitchell 
turned on analysis of “statutory purpose.” Only a 
“statutory purpose” analysis may properly answer 
the question whether Congress implies nontextual 
equity remedies sub silentio when expressly 
mentioning only injunctive powers. Mitchell, 361 
U.S. at 291-92. 
 The Fourth Circuit gave short shrift to 
Petitioner’s actual arguments. Without providing 
their details, the Fourth Circuit labeled them “a 
series of arguments about how the structure, history, 
and purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
weigh against the conclusion that district courts 
have the authority to award consumer redress.” 
(App. at 7a). The Fourth Circuit offered no rationale 
for rejecting these arguments. It indeed praised them 
as “not entirely unpersuasive.” (App. at 7a).  
The Fourth Circuit then exhibited a rare case 
of jurisprudential vertigo. It recognized that 
respecting Petitioner Ross’s arguments would 
“obliterate a significant part of the Commission’s 
remedial arsenal . . . [and] would foresake almost 
thirty years of federal appellate decisions and create 
a circuit conflict.” (App. at 8a). By ruling against her, 
the Fourth Circuit actually deepened a circuit 
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conflict far more encompassing than a single-issue 
conflict, by departing from the District of Columbia 
Circuit’s United States v. Philip Morris decision. 
This Petition does not seek to overturn the 
Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of liability under the 
FTC Act, or the entry of an injunction against 
Petitioner Ross. The Petition instead requests review 
of the statutory authority of the district court to 
award any monetary remedy under Section 13(b). 
 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
 
I. The Fourth Circuit Blindly Followed 
Prior Circuit Decisions that Incorrectly 
Ignored the Impact of Meghrig and Evidence of 
Statutory Purpose, Each of Which 
Independently Forecloses Monetary Remedies 
under Section 13(b) 
 
This Court has noted that “where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another . . . it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 
(1993) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983)). Congress passed Section 19(b) to 
grant the FTC powers which it did not previously 
have. To assume otherwise would be to accuse 
Congress of passing a largely superfluous 
amendment after two years of legislative 
deliberation. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3228-29 (2010) (explaining the statutory canon 
that courts should not “interpret[] any statutory 
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provision in a manner that would render another 
provision superfluous,” even when “Congress enacted 
the provisions at different times”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
It is also an elementary principle of 
administrative law that agencies have only the 
power that Congress grants them. See, e.g., Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) 
(“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s 
power . . . is limited to the authority delegated by 
Congress.”).8 Agencies should not read authority into 
statutes where none exists. “[I]f we were to ‘presume 
a delegation of power’ from the absence of ‘an express 
withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy 
virtually limitless hegemony . . . .’” American Bar 
Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation 
Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (en banc) 
(emphasis in original).  
Despite these foundational principles, in the 
40 years since its Congressional enactment, the FTC 
has transformed Section 13(b) from an injunctive tool 
into a powerful weapon for monetary remedies and 
business-settlement extractions, contrary to the 
                                                 
8 In the Federalist No. 14, James Madison wrote of 
the limited government and enumerated powers 
implied under our Constitution: “In the first place it 
is to be remembered that the general [federal] 
government is not to be charged with the whole 
power of making and administering laws. Its 
jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects. 
. . .” The Federalist No. 14, at 61 (James Madison) 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003). 
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specific intent of Congress and the manifest 
statutory purpose. 
The plain text of Section 13(b) is clear, and 
provides only for the granting of injunctive relief. 
The heading of Section 13(b) is “Temporary 
restraining orders; preliminary injunctions.” 15 
U.S.C. § 53(b). Section 13(b) uses precise wording: “a 
temporary restraining order or a preliminary 
injunction may be granted without bond,” and in the 
final proviso, “[in] proper cases the Commission may 
seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a 
permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (emphasis 
added). The fact that Congress expressly enumerated 
the types of relief available precludes the reading in 
of monetary remedies. See, e.g., Reyes-Gaona v. 
North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 865 
(4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius instructs that where a law expressly 
describes a particular situation to which it shall 
apply, what was omitted or excluded was intended to 
be omitted or excluded”); see also Lamie v. United 
States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 537 (2004) (“courts 
should not add an ‘absent word’ to a statute;” “there 
is a basic difference between filling a gap left by 
Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress 
has affirmatively and specifically enacted.”). 
Here, if Congress intended the FTC to wield 
all equitable remedies within its 1973 enactment of 
Section 13(b), it knew how to do so. Instead, it used 
plain, limiting language. Courts have long recognized 
that within such plain language, injunctions, 
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restitution, and disgorgement are each subspecies of 
the larger category of equitable remedies.9  
Even if the intent of Section 13(b) were not 
clear from its plain text, the legislative history 
provides ample evidence of its purpose as a stopgap 
measure. As discussed extensively above 
(STATEMENT OF THE CASE, Section I), and 
confirmed by a former Chair of the FTC and other 
                                                 
9 Countless court decisions treat the word 
“injunction” as separate from “restitution” or 
“disgorgement,” and treat them all as subspecies of 
“equitable remedies.” E.g., SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 
1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Defendant notes that 
‘[f]orfeiture and penalties are legal remedies, as 
compared to equitable remedies like restitution, 
disgorgement, and injunctions.’”); Horvath v. 
Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 455-56 
(3d Cir. 2003) (plaintiff established a case or 
controversy as to her request for injunctive relief but 
failed to do so with respect to requests for restitution 
and disgorgement); Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54036, at *15 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“Plaintiff's Reply also concedes for the first time 
that he is not entitled to restitution, and thus seeks 
only injunctive relief on behalf of the UCL class.”); 
Jackson v. Truck Drivers' Union Local 42 Health & 
Welfare Fund, 933 F. Supp. 1124, 1136 (D. Mass. 
1996) (Section 502(a)(3) provides only for “equitable 
relief” and a suit to recover plan losses was not “a 
remedy traditionally viewed as ‘equitable,’ such as 
injunction or restitution”). 
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scholars,10 Congress did not enact Section 13(b) in 
1973 to empower the FTC to seek monetary 
remedies. It granted the power to seek monetary 
remedies, with significant limitations and after years 
of legislative debate, through the 1975 enactment of 
Section 19. 
The FTC has enjoyed success for 30 years in 
arguing in the lower courts that the “injunction” 
remedies recited in Section 13(b) invoke any and all 
of the court’s inherent equity powers. The first 
appellate decision to infer ancillary relief (wrongly) 
into the clear wording of Section 13(b) was FTC v. 
Singer, 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982). That court 
found that “unless otherwise provided by statute, all 
the inherent equitable powers of the District Court 
are available for the proper and complete exercise of 
that jurisdiction.” 668 F.2d at 1112 (quoting Porter, 
328 U.S. at 398). It further found that “unless a 
statute in so many words, or by a necessary and 
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s 
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that 
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.” Id. 
(quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398). It reasoned that 
because Section 19 contained a “savings clause” 
stating that its remedies were in addition to and not 
in lieu of any other remedy provided under the FTC 
Act, and that “[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed to affect any authority of the Commission 
under any other provision of law,” it could not be 
inferred that Congress had explicitly acted to restrict 
                                                 
10 Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 6-21; Ward, supra 
n.2, at 1174-94; Thurman & Mallow, supra n.2, at 
305-15. 
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the full scope of equitable remedies in Section 13(b). 
Id. at 1113.  
 Section 13(b) may not be construed so broadly, 
and may not be expanded by judicial fiat to play the 
role that Section 19 plays in the overall statutory 
program. 
 First, the savings clause should be viewed as 
legally irrelevant. To say that a 1975 enactment 
should not be interpreted to “limit” a 1973 enactment 
merely begs the question of what the 1973 enactment 
meant at the time of its passage. Section 19 should 
not be understood to limit the FTC’s authority to 
seek consumer redress under Section 13(b), but 
rather its existence suggests that no such authority 
was ever granted. Beales & Muris, supra n.1, at 26. 
A savings clause such as this one merely preserves 
causes of action and remedies that already existed 
and do not conflict. Id.; see also, Pennsylvania R.R. 
Co. v. Sonman Shaft Coal Co., 242 U.S. 120, 123 
(1916). 
Second, Congress made an express grant of 
power to seek monetary remedies in Section 19(b) – 
Section 13(b)’s sister provision. The Singer court’s 
interpretation renders Section 19(b) superfluous. See 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29. By comparison, this 
Court in Meghrig v. KFC Western stated that where 
“Congress has provided ‘elaborate enforcement 
provisions’ for remedying the violation of a federal 
statute . . . it cannot be assumed that Congress 
intended to authorize by implication additional 
judicial remedies . . . .”11 516 U.S. at 487-88. 
                                                 
11 The Court went so far as to state that “it is an 
elementary canon of statutory construction that 
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In accord with this Court’s pronouncements in 
Meghrig, Sections 13(b) and 19(b) work in concert to 
provide such elaborate enforcement provisions. They 
designate the specific types of relief granted under 
each, and the specific set of facts that must exist in 
order to grant such relief. Congress did not pass each 
provision ignorant of the other.  
 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has split from the FTC-friendly 
circuits by recognizing the limits of inferring judicial 
equitable power. In United States v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 960 (2005), the court found that the 
equitable remedy of disgorgement went above and 
beyond the equitable relief provided by the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The court 
acknowledged the command of Porter granting courts 
a wide equitable berth, but was careful to read the 
wording of the federal statute so as not to run astray 
of Congressional intent. Id. at 1197. Stating that 
courts may only “assume broad equitable powers 
when the statutory or Constitutional grant of power 
is equally broad,” the court noted that the relief-
granting statutory language in Porter was broad (the 
court was permitted to grant “a permanent 
injunction, restraining order, or other order” when 
deciding what relief to grant under the Emergency 
Price Control Act). Id. at 1198 (emphasis added). 
                                                                                                    
where a statute expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading 
others into it.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 488 (quoting 
TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis, 444 
U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).  
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Because “other order[s]” were permitted, the court 
found in that case it was “not a stretch” to read broad 
equitable relief into what the statute permitted. Id.; 
accord Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing 
Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (explaining that 
Porter upheld broad equitable power “not only 
because of the presence of the ‘other order’ language, 
but because of the ‘traditional equity powers of a 
court.’”) (emphasis added) (citing Porter).12 
The language in Porter differs materially from 
the language in Philip Morris, and here. Nowhere in 
Section 13(b) does the statutory wording permit 
“other order,” or “other relief.” In fact, the equitable 
relief granted is specifically enumerated, and only 
includes “temporary restraining orders,” 
“preliminary injunctions,” and “permanent 
                                                 
12 Before the Fourth Circuit did in this case, other 
courts have misinterpreted Mitchell as rendering 
irrelevant the “other order” language in Porter, 
contrary to this Court’s explanation of Porter in 
Bannercraft, 415 U.S. at 19. E.g., FTC v. Bronson 
Partners LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365-67 (2d Cir. 2011). 
Even a superficial review shows that the rationale in 
Porter for permitting wide monetary relief was based 
on the existence of “other order” in the list of 
statutory authorizations. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399 (“An 
order for the recovery and restitution of illegal rents 
may be considered a proper ‘other order’ on either of 
two theories: . . . .”). Often what the lower courts cite 
within Porter when granting the FTC broad powers 
under Section 13(b) comes from the following 
paragraphs containing the two theories why “other 
order” language implies broad equitable powers. 
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injunctions.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). In contrast, Section 
19(b) resembles the language of the statute in Porter, 
in that it expressly provides that the enumerated 
remedies “shall include, but shall not be limited to,” 
specific types of monetary relief. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). 
In addition, the court in Philip Morris engaged the 
canons of noscitur a sociis and eijusdem generis to 
find that a list of explicit remedies in a statute 
should only be expanded, if at all, “with remedies 
similar in nature to those enumerated.” 396 F.3d at 
1200. Stating that the remedies explicitly provided in 
the statute were all directed at future conduct, the 
court found that disgorgement, which is meant to 
remedy past harm, could not properly be inferred as 
an additional equitable remedy. Id.  
The parallels to Section 13(b) are striking. As 
has been stated both in the legislative history and by 
courts alike (including the Singer court, which 
nonetheless expanded the scope of Section 13(b)’s 
equitable relief to include monetary relief), the 
purpose of Section 13(b) is to maintain the status 
quo, a forward-looking remedy. In contrast, 
consumer redress is backward-looking relief intended 
to remedy past consumer harm. 
Finally, like other courts before it, the Fourth 
Circuit’s silence on Meghrig v. KFC Western reveals 
the inadequacy of past legal analyses. The Fourth 
Circuit did not cite or discuss Meghrig, where this 
Court unanimously held that courts lack “equitable 
restitution” powers under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA). Id., 516 U.S. at 481-88 
(denying past cost recovery for waste cleanup). 
Meghrig distinguished the United States’ attempt (as 
amicus curiae) to apply Porter to evidence 
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restitutionary power within remedies that Megrig 
labeled (id. at 484) a “prohibitive injunction” and a 
“mandatory injunction.” Id. at 487-88. Meghrig 
compared RCRA to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Recovery and Cleanup Act 
(CERCLA), and concluded, “Congress thus 
demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to 
provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and that 
the language used to define the remedies under 
RCRA does not provide that remedy.” Id. at 485. 
Meghrig’s distinction from Porter applies with 
equal force here. The Court observed, “the limited 
remedies described in [RCRA], along with the stark 
differences between the language of [the RCRA 
injunction] section and the cost recovery provisions of 
CERCLA, amply demonstrate that Congress did not 
intend [equitable restitution] under RCRA.” Id. at 
487. This analysis applies fully to Sections 13(b) and 
19(b). Section 13(b) remedies compare with RCRA’s 
injunction provisions, while Section 19(b) remedies 
compare with CERCLA’s explicit cost recovery 
provisions. To reword the key part of Meghrig 
accordingly, “Congress thus demonstrated in [Section 
19(b)] that it knew how to provide for [consumer 
redress], and that the language used to define the 
remedies under [Section 13(b)] does not provide that 
remedy.” Id. at 485. 
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II. The Issue is Fully Percolated, With No 
Circuit Court Having Performed a Proper 
Analysis of Statutory Purpose, and With No 
Circuit Court Having Cited or Distinguished 
Meghrig 
 
 The monetary relief issue is fully percolated, 
and the decision below is already being used to 
stretch FTC powers even more. Just this month, the 
Government filed a brief in this Court citing the 
decision below. Brief for the Respondant in 
Opposition, Publishers Business Services, Inc. v. FTC 
(Case No. 13-1045) (May 2014) (“Government’s PBS 
Brief”). The Government’s PBS Brief boasts that “the 
courts of appeals have uniformly held that, upon a 
showing by the FTC that a defendant has engaged in 
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ in violation of 
15 U.S.C. 45, the district courts may order not only 
prospective injunctive relief, but also ancillary 
remedies, including equitable monetary relief, to 
achieve complete justice.” Id. at 9.13  
After spending two pages fighting this issue, 
the Government’s PBS Brief strangely acknowledges 
                                                 
13 Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, a 
longstanding statutory misapplication does not 
immunize such an error from this Court’s review. See 
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177, 191 (1994), superseded on 
other grounds by 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (1995) (overruling 
sixty years of allowance of a statutory cause of action 
because Congress had not expressly provided for that 
cause of action). 
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that “Petitioners do not dispute that equitable 
monetary relief can be awarded under Section 13(b).” 
Id. at 11. As Lady MacBeth “doth protest too much,” 
so too does the Government.  
 The Government’s PBS Brief at note 1 
purports to catalog the decisions of the circuit courts 
supporting its position. None of the Government’s 
authorities (nor the one additional authority cited by 
the Fourth Circuit below) performed the proper 
analysis required by Porter and its progeny, 
especially Meghrig. This section addresses each such 
circuit court decision in turn: 
 FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 891 (4th Cir. 
2014): As already discussed, the Ross decision (this 
case) conducted no analysis of statutory purpose of 
Section 13(b), and did not cite or analyze Meghrig, 
nothwithstanding that decision’s centrality to 
Petitioner’s arguments below. 
 FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 
359, 366 (2d Cir. 2011): The Bronson Partners 
decision does not cite or acknowledge Meghrig. It 
also erroneously states that Mitchell “made clear” 
that the Porter Court’s significance given to the 
“other order” language was not, in fact, tied to the 
“other order” language. 654 F.3d at 366. That is 
wrong, since Porter itself states that the monetary 
remedy under review “may be considered a proper 
‘other order’ on either of two theories,” and goes on to 
state what they were. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399; see 
also supra, n.12; Bannercraft, 415 U.S. at 19 
(explaining “the presence of the ‘other order’ 
language” as one reason why Porter “upheld broad 
equitable power.”). 
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The Bronson Partners decision nonetheless 
contends there to be a rationale for liberating the 
Porter ratio decendi from the “other order” language, 
supposedly finding that rationale in Mitchell. 654 
F.3d at 366. But Mitchell did no such thing. Mitchell 
instead simply found statutory purpose evidence 
equivalent to Porter’s “other order” language in the 
facts at bar. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291-92 (finding 
that “complete relief in light of the statutory 
purposes” that will “give effect to the policy of the 
legislature” must include compensation for wrongful 
retaliatory discharge because “fear of economic 
retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved 
employees quietly to accept substandard 
conditions.”). Mitchell observed that the monetary 
relief in question bolstered the statutory purposes 
because “[w]e cannot read the Act as presenting 
those it sought to protect with what is little more 
than a Hobson’s choice.” Id. at 293. In its conclusion, 
Mitchell underscored that its discernment of the 
power to award a particular kind of limited monetary 
relief (reimbursement for lost wages due to wrongful 
retaliatory discharge) was based on “what we have 
found to be the statutory purposes.” Id. at 296. 
 The Bronson Partners decision materially 
miscites Mitchell in this regard. It contended that 
Mitchell reads Porter to allow wide ancillary 
remedies “as necessary to afford complete relief.” 654 
F.2d at 366. However, Bronson Partners ended the 
quotation too soon. Mitchell’s actual words are 
“complete relief in light of the staututory purposes.” 
Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added). As 
discussed above, the manifest statutory purpose of 
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Section 13(b) was solely limited to injunctive relief, 
without further monetary remedies. 
 FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 
F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2010): Direct Marketing 
Concepts is inapposite. Appellant did not challenge 
the availability of monetary remedies vel non. Thus, 
the First Circuit performed no analysis of whether 
monetary remedies are available under Section 
13(b), but rather resolved disputes as to what kind. 
Id.  
 FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 
1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005): As with Direct 
Marketing, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Freecom 
Communications did not include any challenge to the 
availability of monetary relief under Section 13(b). If 
anything, it is even less apposite since there was not 
any dispute as to the kinds of monetary remedies 
available. 
 FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468 
(11th Cir. 1996): As with Direct Marketing and 
Freecom Communications, the Appellant in Gem 
Merchandising did not challenge the availability of 
monetary relief under Section 13(b). Gem 
Merchandising is more akin to Direct Marketing, 
since the dispute centered solely on the type of 
monetary remedies permitted. The appellant agreed 
that consumer redress was allowed, but argued 
(unsuccessfully) that disgorgement was a penalty 
and not redress, and that payment into the United 
States Treasury was disallowed. 87 F.3d at 468-69. 
While the Eleventh Circuit cited Porter in addressing 
the questions presented, the court did not consider or 
analyze the statutory purpose of Section 13(b).  
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 FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 
(9th Cir. 1994): As with Direct Marketing, Freecom 
Communications and Gem Merchandising, the Ninth 
Circuit’s Pantron I decision contains no indication 
that the appellant challenged the availability of 
monetary relief under Section 13(b) vel non. Instead, 
with all parties apparently assuming that such relief 
was permissible, the Pantron I court addressed 
whether the lower court erred in finding that the 
FTC had not proven consumer injury caused by 
adjudged misrepresentations. 33 F.3d at 1102. 
 FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion 
Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(cited by decision below, but not cited in 
Government’s PBS Brief): The Eighth Circuit in 
Security Rare Coin also found the availability of 
monetary remedies under Section 13(b), but did not 
consider that Section’s statutory purpose. In a 
decision that predated Meghrig, the court concluded 
without much analysis that “[n]othing in the wording 
of the statute expressly precludes ancillary equitable 
relief.” 931 F.2d at 1314. While Security Rare Coin 
did address the existence of Section 19, it wrongly 
concluded that the savings clause in Section 19(e) 
nullified any significance for interpreting Section 
13(b): “There can be no inference from this language 
that Congress intended section 19 to restrict the 
broad equitable jurisdiction granted to the district 
court by section 13(b).” Id. at 1315. As discussed 
above in Argument Section I, the savings clause 
cannot be read this way to brush aside parts of a 
comprehensive regulatory program, particularly in 
light of the extensive legislative history leading up to 
the enactment of Section 19. Like every other court, 
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the Eighth Circuit ignored that history, as well as 
the statutory purpose manifested in the respective 
enactments themselves. 
FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 
564, 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 
(1989): Finally, the Amy Travel decision also lacks 
any analysis of statutory purpose, and also predates 
this Court’s Meghrig decision. The Seventh Circuit 
relied on one of its prior decisions concerning 
preliminary injunctions under Section 13(b) to 
expand dicta concerning monetary remedies to 
permanent injunctions under Section 13(b). 875 F.2d 
at 571. In its prior decision (FTC v. World Travel 
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 
1988)), the appellant did not contest the availability 
of ancillary equitable remedies, including an asset 
freeze, under Section 13(b). Rather, the appellant 
contested whether a preliminary injunction 
proceeding was allowed at all in a case filed by the 
FTC under the last proviso of Section 13(b), which 
solely mentions permanent injunctions. World 
Travel, 861 F.2d at 1025-26 (holding that the final 
proviso is not limited to permanent injunctions 
despite its text). Thus, when the Seventh Circuit 
based its Amy Travel decision on World Travel, it 
eschewed any analysis whatsoever of statutory 
purpose, and gave stare decisis effect to previously-
nondisputed dictum. 
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III. This Case Provides an Ideal Vehicle to 
Stop the FTC’s Abuse of Power  
 
 For the first time since before Meghrig,14 this 
case squarely presents the question of the FTC’s 
authority to seek monetary remedies under Section 
13(b). The question has fully percolated through 
most of the circuit courts. It is a question of 
exceptional importance, rarely arising before this 
Court because of the immense settlement pressures 
imposed by the very tactics that this Petition 
addresses. This case also provides an opportunity for 
this Court to resolve an inconsistency in the circuits’ 
application of this Court’s Porter decision. 
 
A. The Exceptional Importance of Confining 
FTC Activities to Their Proper Statutory Scope 
 
 The FTC must believe it has a green light to 
misuse its authority since it filed over 300 
complaints under Section 13(b) seeking monetary 
relief between 2007 and 2013. (App. at 54a). The 
FTC boasts over $2 billion in actual or potential 
proceeds in this period from such efforts. (App. at 
54a). While the frequency and monetary 
consequences alone of this government overreach 
signal the extraordinary need for review, there is 
more. 
Ironically, it was the Fourth Circuit that 
warned about agency creep, observing that 
“government agencies have a tendency to swell, not 
                                                 
14 This Court denied certiorari on this issue in Amy 
Travel, 493 U.S. 954 (1989). 
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shrink, and are likely to have an expansive view of 
their mission.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. FDA, 
153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998), aff’d 529 U.S. 120 
(2000) (citation omitted). The federal court system 
has been unusually tolerant of the FTC’s expanding 
mandate, based in part on “weak research” by federal 
courts and “sympathy” for its mission. Roach, supra 
n.2, at 1309. That tolerance has now raised alarm 
bells from unexpected quarters. 
 Having received no resistance to its 
nonstatutory assertion of monetary remedy powers 
under Section 13(b), the FTC has now expanded its 
activities beyond the “Fraud Program” mentioned 
earlier. The FTC is now using its enforcement 
authority under Section 13(b) against well known 
companies who are themselves victims of fraud. This 
new tack appears most prominently within the FTC’s 
use of Section 13(b) against retailers and hotel 
chains victimized by data breaches, having allegedly 
failed to maintain reasonable and appropriate data 
security for consumers’ personal information.  
 The District of New Jersey granted the latest 
green light to the FTC, over the objections of twelve 
substantial district court amici, including the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, the American Hotel & Lodging Association, 
Public Citizen, the National Federation of 
Independent Business and TechFreedom. See FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47622, at *10 n.3 (D.N.J. 2014) 
(denying motion to dismiss; listing amici). In 
Wyndham, the hotel chain and its amici were unable 
to obtain dismissal, even though the FTC lacked 
express statutory authority to regulate in the data 
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security context, and had issued neither formal 
regulations on the subject nor guidance adequate to provide 
fair notice. Id. It is no stretch to realize that the FTC’s 
self-granted authority puts legitimate, victimized 
companies at risk of massive monetary liabilities 
without any protections that Section 19 should 
provide. Such monetary liabilities might be sought 
in, at best, the outer edge of the FTC’s proper area of 
activity.15 
 Circuit court decisions allowing the FTC to 
extract monetary remedies under Section 13(b) have 
now been used to justify expanding equitable relief 
under other injunction-only statutes. For example, 
the Tenth Circuit cited FTC Act cases to justify 
injecting monetary remedies into injunction-only 
provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 301, et seq. United States v. RX Depot, Inc., 
438 F.3d 1052, 1054-63 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
argument that Meghrig limits Porter/Mitchell). The 
Sixth Circuit did the same in United States v. 
Universal Management Services, Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 
760-62 (6th Cir. 1999). This distinct area of federal 
regulatory law, outside of FTC jurisdiction, would 
benefit from this Court’s clarification of the scope of 
Porter and Mitchell in view of Meghrig. 
 
                                                 
15 Sometimes the FTC’s misuse of Section 13(b) sets 
in motion a sequence of events leading to the target’s 
loss of liberty, such as has happened when a former 
FTC target allegedly violated a cooercive consent 
decree, triggering contempt proceedings.  
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B. The Rarity of Opportunities to Review 
This Fully Percolated Issue 
 
 The FTC structured the Fraud Program in a 
way that dissuades defendants from vindicating 
their rights through litigation. These tactics rely on 
the overreaching interpretation of Section 13(b) 
exposed in this Petition, tactics calculated to 
circumvent the Congressionally-devised defendant 
protections of Section 19. Very few FTC litigants 
have ever had the capacity or courage to bring this 
issue before this Court. 
The FTC typically begins a Section 13(b) 
monetary remedy action by filing it under seal, 
obtaining a secret asset freeze in a temporary 
restraining order. The FTC then allows unsealing of 
the complaint to begin preliminary injunction 
proceedings. By this point, all affected persons – 
usually including corporate leadership who are 
personally named and whose personal assets are 
frozen – must plead for permission from the court to 
partially unfreeze assets, simply to have living 
expenses and to retain and keep counsel.16 The FTC’s 
high settlement rate depends on placing defendants 
in this coerced state. As one commentator explained: 
 
                                                 
16 Richard Newman, FTC Enforcement Actions, Asset 
Freezes and Personal Liability, Performance Mktg. 
Insider (Apr. 27, 2014), 
http://performinsider.com/2014/04/ftc-enforcement-
actions-asset-freezes-and-personal-liability/ (last 
visited May 16, 2014). 
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Settled or stipulated verdicts are very common 
and the rate of injunctive relief appears high. 
From anecdotal notes in FTC reports it 
appears that defendants to FTC settlements 
and awards are often financially unable to 
fund the monetary award and must seek 
reductions from the FTC or bankruptcy 
protection. Personal liability for the principals 
is frequently in dispute. The mass action 
aspects of FTC litigation discourage rescission 
or counter-restitution in kind. It would be 
reasonable to surmise that a defendant might 
readily settle for an injunction and a moderate 
monetary award rather than face the prospect 
of defending a claim for a large claim for gross 
disgorgement in a district court that has 
previously agreed to follow the FTC’s 
aggressive theory of monetary damages in 
equity. 
 
Roach, supra n.2, at 1315. 
 In short, litigants face immense pressure not 
to bring the FTC’s overreach before this Court. 
Litigants perceive the profound reluctance of the 
remaining circuit courts – those that might later 
hear the issue as one of first impression – to create a 
circuit conflict (as happened here). On top of that, 
litigants most often proceed under extreme duress 
just to have defenses heard that they believe to be 
meritorious. This Court should sieze this rare 
opportunity for review, as it may not come again for 
many decades, during which time the FTC will 
continue to conduct its nonstatutory activities and 
expand them into unexpected business areas. 
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 C. The District of Columbia Circuit 
Conflicts with the Fourth Circuit Approach, In 
that It Excludes Monetary Relief from 
Injunctive-Only Statutes Where the 
Comprehensive Statutory Framework Includes 
Other Statutes that Permit It 
 
 Finally, while no direct circuit conflict exists 
on the issue presented, the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit on the 
proper application of Porter and its progeny. Since 
the conflict is more generalized than a single-issue 
split, it potentially reaches many different statutory 
regimes, not just the FTC Act. Viewed this way, the 
situation at hand is jurisprudentially worse than the 
single-issue circuit conflicts that often motivate this 
Court’s review.  
 The Fourth Circuit’s decision here cited 
United States v. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 960 (2005), as contrary 
authority to its holding. (App. at 6a). Namely, the 
District of Columbia Circuit in Philip Morris held 
that an injunction section of the RICO Act did not 
permit a disgorgement remedy since RICO provided 
elaborate enforcement provisions elsewhere for such 
relief. Id. at 1198. The District of Columbia Circuit’s 
understanding and application of Porter and Mitchell 
is hopelessly conflicted with the same understanding 
and application by the Fourth Circuit below. As just 
one example, the Philip Morris decision gives full 
weight (correctly) to this Court’s identification of 
“other order” language as critical to the ratio decendi 
in Porter. Id. Yet the Fourth Circuit held the 
opposite, finding (contrary to the District of 
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Columbia Circuit’s analysis) that Mitchell greatly 
broadened Porter’s holding and negated the 
significance of the “other order” language.  
 In its 2005 petition for a writ of certiorari in 
Philip Morris (Case No. 05-92) (Government’s PM 
Petition), the Government agreed that a circuit 
conflict exists that transcends subject area. There, 
the Government urged review because Philip Morris 
was “inconsistent with numerous decisions of other 
courts of appeals applying the principles of Porter 
and Mitchell to other statutory schemes.” 
Government’s PM Petition at 19 n.6. Not 
surprisingly, the Government included a citation 
applying Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. Id. (citing 
FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th 
Cir. 1996)).17  
 Only confusion can result from these opposing 
approaches. The conflict renders unstable the extent 
of nontextual, ancillary equitable remedies within 
federal injunction statutes. This case presents the 
opportunity to clarify the law and eliminate the 
confusion. 
 
                                                 
17 The Governement also named opinions 
interpreting Section 332(a) of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 332(a)); the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)-(e); the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980; and the Commodity 
Exchange Act. Government’s PM Petition at 19 n.6. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a 
writ of certiorari should be granted. 
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APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT, DECIDED FEBRUARY 25, 2014 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2340
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KRISTY ROSS, individually and as offi cer of 
Innovative Marketing, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
INNOVATIVE MARKETING, INC., d/b/a 
Winsolutions FZ-LLC, d/b/a Billingnow, d/b/a 
Winpayment Consultancy SPC, d/b/a BillPlanet PTE 
Ltd., d/b/a Revenue Response Sunwell, d/b/a Globedat, 
d/b/a Winsecure Solutions, d/b/a Synergy Software BV, 
d/b/a Innovative Marketing Ukraine; BYTEHOSTING 
INTERNET SERVICES, LLC; JAMES RENO, 
d/b/a Setupahost.net, individually, and as an offi cer 
of ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC; SAM JAIN, 
individually and as an offi cer of Innovative Marketing, 
Inc.; DANIEL SUNDIN, d/b/a Vantage Software, 
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d/b/a Winsoftware, Ltd., individually and as an offi cer 
of Innovative Marketing, Inc.; MARC D’SOUZA, d/b/a 
Web Integrated Net Solutions, individually and as an 
offi cer of Innovative Marketing, Inc.; 
MAURICE D’SOUZA,
Defendants.
JUDGES: Before DAVIS and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, 
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Judge Davis 
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Senior Judge 
Hamilton joined.
OPINION BY: DAVIS
OPINION
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
The Federal Trade Commission sued Kristy Ross 
in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland for 
engaging in deceptive internet advertising practices. 
After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment 
enjoining Ross from participating in the deceptive 
practices and holding her jointly and severally liable for 
equitable monetary consumer redress in the amount of 
$163,167,539.95. F.T.C. v. Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d 369, 388-
89 (D. Md. 2012). On appeal, Ross challenges the district 
court’s judgment on several bases: (1) the court’s authority 
to award consumer redress; (2) the legal standard the 
court applied in fi nding individual liability under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act; (3) the court’s prejudicial 
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evidentiary rulings; and fi nally, (4) the soundness of the 
district court’s factual fi ndings. For the reasons set forth 
within, we affi rm.
I
The Commission sued Innovative Marketing, Inc. 
(“IMI”), and several of its high-level executives and 
founders, including Ross, for running a deceptive internet 
“scareware” scheme in violation of the prohibition on 
deceptive advertising in Section 5(a) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The core of the 
Commission’s case was that the defendants operated “a 
massive, Internet-based scheme that trick[ed] consumers 
into purchasing computer security software,” referred 
to as “scareware.” J.A. 29. The advertisements would 
advise consumers that a scan of their computers had 
been performed that had detected a variety of dangerous 
fi les, like viruses, spyware, and “illegal” pornography; in 
reality, no scans were ever conducted. J.A. 29.
Ross, a Vice President at IMI, hired counsel and 
defended against the suit; the remaining defendants either 
settled or had default judgment entered against them.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor 
of the Commission on the issue of whether the advertising 
was deceptive, but it set for trial the issue of whether Ross 
could be held individually liable under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, i.e., whether Ross “was a ‘control person’ 
at the company, and to what extent she had authority for, 
and knowledge of the deceptive acts committed by the 
company.” J.A. 925.
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After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of 
the Commission. Specifi cally, it found that Ross’
broad responsibilities at IMI coupled 
with the fact that she personally 
fi nanced corporate expenses, oversaw 
a large amount of employees and had a 
hand in the creation and dissemination 
of the deceptive ads prove[d] by a 
preponderance of the evidence that 
she had authority to control and 
directly participated in the deceptive 
acts within the meaning of Section 5 of 
the [Federal Trade Commission] Act.
Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 384. The district court further 
concluded that Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive 
marketing scheme, or was “at the very least recklessly 
indifferent or intentionally avoided the truth” about the 
scheme. Id. at 386. It entered judgment against Ross in 
the amount of $163,167,539.95, and it enjoined her from 
engaging in similar deceptive marketing practices. Id. at 
389. Ross timely appealed.
II
The Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the 
Commission to sue in federal district court so that “in 
proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper 
proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” 15 
U.S.C. § 53(b). Ross contends that the district court did not 
have the authority to award consumer redress - a money 
judgment - under this provision of the statute.
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Ross first takes the position, correctly, that the 
statute’s text does not expressly authorize the award of 
consumer redress, but precedent dictates otherwise: the 
Supreme Court has long held that Congress’ invocation 
of the federal district court’s equitable jurisdiction brings 
with it the full “power to decide all relevant matters in 
dispute and to award complete relief even though the 
decree includes that which might be conferred by a court 
of law.” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399, 
66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946). Once invoked by 
Congress in one of its duly enacted statutes, the district 
court’s inherent equitable powers cannot be “denied or 
limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command.” Id. Porter and its progeny thus articulate an 
interpretive principle that inserts a presumption into what 
would otherwise be the standard exercise of statutory 
construction: we presume that Congress, in statutorily 
authorizing the exercise of the district court’s injunctive 
power, “acted cognizant of the historic power of equity 
to provide complete relief in light of statutory purposes.” 
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 
291-92, 80 S. Ct. 332, 4 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1960).
Applying this principle to the present case illuminates 
the legislative branch’s real intent. That is, by authorizing 
the district court to issue a permanent injunction in the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2), 
Congress presumably authorized the district court to 
exercise the full measure of its equitable jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, absent some countervailing indication 
suffi cient to rebut the presumption, the court had suffi cient 
statutory power to award “complete relief,” including 
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monetary consumer redress, which is a form of equitable 
relief. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399.
Ross insists that the text of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act is unlike that of the statutes at issue 
in Porter and Mitchell, and therefore argues that the 
interpretive principle of those cases is inapplicable in 
her case. In Porter, a case involving the Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942, the statute authorized district 
courts to grant “a permanent or temporary injunction, 
restraining order, or other order.” 328 U.S. at 397 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). Ross contends that the 
“other order” language, absent from the instant provision 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, cabins Porter’s 
applicability. See also United States v. Phillip Morris 
USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1198, 364 U.S. App. D.C. 454 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). In other words, her argument is that 
Porter was a “magic words” case - if Congress uses the 
magic words “other order,” then Congress has invoked 
the full injunctive powers of the district court.
Ross’ magic words argument fails because it ignores 
how the Supreme Court subsequently untethered 
its reasoning from the “other order” language of the 
Emergency Price Control Act and signifi cantly expanded 
Porter’s holding. The language of the statute at issue in 
Mitchell, the Fair Labor Standards Act, was different 
from the language of the statute in Porter, providing 
only that the district court had jurisdiction to “restrain 
violations of Section 15.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289 (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). Notwithstanding the 
silence of the Fair Labor Standards Act as to the district 
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court’s express power to award reimbursement of lost 
wages and the absence of the “other order” language, the 
Court held that ordering reimbursement was nevertheless 
permissible under the holding of Porter. 361 U.S. at 296. In 
comparing the language of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
with the Emergency Price Control Act, the Mitchell Court 
reasoned that the “other order” provision was merely an 
“affi rmative confi rmation” – icing on the cake – over and 
above the district court’s inherent equitable powers. See 
id. at 291.
The point is that Mitchell broadened Porter’s 
applicability, rendering the textual statutory differences 
irrelevant to the ultimate conclusion: because there is 
no affi rmative and clear legislative restriction on the 
equitable powers of the district court, ordering monetary 
consumer redress is an appropriate “equitable adjunct” 
to the district court’s injunctive power. Porter, 328 U.S. 
at 399.
Ross makes a series of arguments about how the 
structure, history, and purpose of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act weigh against the conclusion that district 
courts have the authority to award consumer redress; her 
arguments are not entirely unpersuasive, but they have 
ultimately been rejected by every other federal appellate 
court that has considered this issue. F.T.C. v. Bronson 
Partners LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365-67 (2d Cir. 2011); F.T.C. 
v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 
1989); F.T.C. v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 
F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991); F.T.C. v. Pantron I 
Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1994); F.T.C. v. Gem 
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Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996). 
We adopt the reasoning of those courts and reject Ross’ 
attempt to obliterate a signifi cant part of the Commission’s 
remedial arsenal. A ruling in favor of Ross would forsake 
almost thirty years of federal appellate decisions and 
create a circuit split, a result that we will not countenance 
in the face of powerful Supreme Court authority pointing 
in the other direction.
III
The Federal Trade Commission Act makes it 
unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation 
“to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false 
advertisement” in commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 52(a), and it 
authorizes the Commission to bring suit in federal district 
court when it fi nds that any such person, partnership, or 
corporation “is engaged in, or is about to engage in, the 
dissemination or the causing of the dissemination of any” 
false advertisement, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a)(1).
The district court ruled that one could be held 
individually liable under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act if the Commission proves that the individual (1) 
participated directly in the deceptive practices or had 
authority to control them, and (2) had knowledge of the 
deceptive conduct, which could be satisfi ed by showing 
evidence of actual knowledge, reckless indifference to 
the truth, or an awareness of a high probability of fraud 
combined with intentionally avoiding the truth (i.e., willful 
blindness). Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
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Ross contends that the district court’s standard was 
wrong and asks us to reject it. She proposes that we import 
a standard from our securities fraud jurisprudence that 
requires proof of an individual’s (1) “authority to control 
the specifi c practices alleged to be deceptive,” coupled 
with a (2) “failure to act within such control authority 
while aware of apparent fraud.” App. Br. 35 (citing 
Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 
2001)). Any other standard, argues Ross, would permit 
a fi nding of individual liability based on “indicia having 
more to do with enthusiasm for and skill at one’s job 
[rather] than authority over specifi c ad campaigns, and 
allow fault to be shown without any actual awareness of” 
a co-worker’s misdeeds. App. Br. 36. Ross maintains that 
she would not have been held individually liable under her 
proposed standard.
Ross’ proposed standard would permit the Commission 
to pursue individuals only when they had actual awareness 
of specifi c deceptive practices and failed to act to stop 
the deception, i.e., a specifi c intent/subjective knowledge 
requirement; her proposal would effectively leave the 
Commission with the “futile gesture” of obtaining “an 
order directed to the lifeless entity of a corporation while 
exempting from its operation the living individuals who 
were responsible for the illegal practices” in the fi rst place. 
Pati-Port, Inc. v. F.T.C., 313 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1963).
We hold that one may be found individually liable 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act if she (1) 
participated directly in the deceptive practices or had 
authority to control those practices, and (2) had or should 
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have had knowledge of the deceptive practices. The second 
prong of the analysis may be established by showing that 
the individual had actual knowledge of the deceptive 
conduct, was recklessly indifferent to its deceptiveness, 
or had an awareness of a high probability of deceptiveness 
and intentionally avoided learning the truth.
Our ruling maintains uniformity across the country and 
avoids a split in the federal appellate courts. Every other 
federal appellate court to resolve the issue has adopted 
the test we embrace today. F.T.C. v. Direct Marketing 
Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2010); Amy Travel 
Service, 875 F.2d at 573-74; F.T.C. v. Publishing Clearing 
House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997); F.T.C. v. 
Freecom Communications, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th 
Cir. 2005); Gem Merchandising Corp., 87 F.3d at 470. 
Ross’ proposed standard, by contrast, invites us to ignore 
the law of every other sister court that has considered the 
issue, an invitation that we decline.
IV
Ross next mounts three evidentiary challenges. First, 
Ross contends that the district court improperly precluded 
her expert, Scott Ellis, from testifying about how “the 
advertisements linkable to Ms. Ross’s responsibilities 
were nondeceptive.” App. Br. 29. As the district court 
correctly ruled, however, Ellis’ testimony was irrelevant 
because it had already decided the deceptiveness issue in 
favor of the Commission at summary judgment. The only 
issue held over for trial was whether Ross had the requisite 
degree of control necessary to hold her individually liable 
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for the company’s deceptive practices, i.e., whether she 
participated directly in the company’s deceptive practices 
or had authority to control those practices and had or 
should have had knowledge of those practices. Because 
the individual liability standard does not require a specifi c 
link from Ross to particular deceptive advertisements 
and instead looks at whether she had authority to control 
the corporate entity’s practices, Ellis’ testimony was 
immaterial, and thus irrelevant, to the issue reserved for 
trial. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Second, Ross challenges the admission of a 2004 to 
2006 profi t and loss statement that the district court relied 
on to calculate the amount of consumer redress. The 
documents were produced during discovery in corporate 
litigation involving some of Ross’ co-defendants in Canada. 
Daniel Sundin and Sam Jain sued Marc D’Souza, all 
of whom were co-defendants of Ross in this case and 
executives at IMI. Jain submitted an affi davit along with 
a profi t and loss summary for the company for the period 
of 2004 to 2006; the documents were “litigation-purpose 
fi nancial summaries [of IMI’s profi ts] described in [Jain’s] 
affi davit as a Quickbooks printout.” App. Br. 31, J.A. 1790, 
1799.
Although the district court admitted the profi t and 
loss statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the 
residual exception to the rule against hearsay, F.T.C. v. 
Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129353, 2012 WL 4018037, 
at *1-3 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2012), we may affi rm the district 
court “on the basis of any ground supported by the record 
even if it is not the basis relied upon by the district court,” 
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Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1999), and 
we conclude that the profi t and loss summary plainly was 
admissible as an adoptive admission by Ross. Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(B). Ross expressly adopted Jain’s affi davit: she 
swore in her own affi davit produced during the Canadian 
litigation that she had read Jain’s affi davit and was “in 
agreement with [its] contents.” J.A. 1590. She did take 
some exceptions, but she did not object to the profi t and 
loss statement attached to Jain’s affi davit, nor did she 
object to the authenticity or reliability of the statements.
The third of Ross’ evidentiary assignments of error 
also rests on the improper admission of hearsay evidence: 
an e-mail from Sundin to Jettis, a payment processor, 
listing Skype numbers and titles for a group of high-
level company executives. Ross’ telephone number is 
listed on the e-mail, as is her title, “Vice President.” The 
district court admitted the e-mail pursuant to the hearsay 
exception for statements made by a co-conspirator in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)
(E). Ross argues that there was insuffi cient evidence 
establishing as a predicate for the e-mail’s admission 
the existence of the conspiracy, and that admission of 
the e-mail itself was improper “bootstrapping” of the 
existence of the conspiracy to the document’s admissibility. 
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81, 107 
S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987).
We disagree. It is true, of course, that the proponent 
for admission of a co-conspirator’s out-of-court statement 
“must demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy by 
evidence extrinsic to the hearsay statements.” United 
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States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1976). 
But that requirement was satisfi ed in this case. There 
was independent evidence that established the existence 
of the conspiracy: Ross produced an affi davit during the 
corporate litigation in Canada in which she stated that she 
was a Vice President and one of the founders of IMI, and 
she adopted the affi davits of her co-defendants attesting 
to the same facts. The affi davits provided a suffi cient 
basis upon which the district court could conclude, prima 
facie, see United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320, 323 (4th 
Cir. 1973), the existence of a conspiracy. Moreover, the 
e-mail from Sundin to Jettis was a quintessential example 
of a statement made “in furtherance” of the conspiracy 
because its role was to maintain the logistics of the 
conspiracy and “identify names and roles” of members of 
the deceptive advertising endeavor. Michael H. Graham, 
Handbook of Federal Evidence 421 (7th ed. 2013).
In sum, we fi nd no reversible error in the district 
court’s evidentiary rulings that are challenged on appeal 
by Ross.
V
Ross’ last contention is that the district court clearly 
erred in fi nding that she had “control” of the company, 
participated in any deceptive acts, and had knowledge 
of the deceptive advertisements. In a bench trial, we 
review the district court’s factual findings for clear 
error and its legal conclusions de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52; 
Helton v. AT&T, Inc., 709 F.3d 343, 351 (4th Cir. 2013). 
“In cases in which a district court’s factual fi ndings turn 
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on assessments of witness credibility or the weighing of 
confl icting evidence during a bench trial, such fi ndings 
are entitled to even greater deference.” Helton, 709 F.3d 
at 351.
The district court did not clearly err in finding 
that Ross had “authority to control the deceptive acts 
within the meaning” of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 383. In an affi davit in the 
Canadian litigation, she swore that she was a high-level 
business offi cial with duties involving, among other things, 
“product optimization,” which the district court could 
reasonably have inferred afforded her authority and 
control over the nature and quality of the advertisements. 
J.A. 1589. Moreover, there was evidence that other 
employees requested Ross’ authority to approve certain 
advertisements, and that she would check the design of 
the advertisements before approving them.
Nor did the district court clearly err in fi nding that 
Ross “directly participated in the deceptive marketing 
scheme.” Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 384. Ross’ statements 
to other employees, as memorialized in chat logs between 
her and other employees were evidence that she served 
in a managerial role, directing the design of particular 
advertisements. J.A. 3580 (“anyway we have to get all this 
advertisement stuff off these ads can you please [make] 
sure it happens it needs to happen for all domains”); J.A. 
1491 (“btw we have some 30 creatives for errclean [sic] 
not just 2-3 just add aggression tot hem [sic]”). Ross was 
a contact person for the purchase of advertising space for 
IMI, and there was evidence that Ross had the authority 
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to discipline staff and developers when the work did not 
meet her standards. J.A. 1466 (“please ensure its [sic] 
going to be done or im [sic] going to fi ne the department 
and MCs for not fi nishing it”). Given these facts, the 
district court could have reasonably inferred that Ross 
was actively and directly participating in multiple stages 
of the deceptive advertising scheme - she played a role 
in design, directed others to “add aggression” to certain 
advertisements, was in a position of authority, had the 
power to discipline entire departments, and purchased 
substantial advertising space.
The district court did not clearly err in finding 
that Ross “had actual knowledge of the deceptive 
marketing scheme” and/or that she was “at the very 
least recklessly indifferent or intentionally avoided the 
truth.” Ross, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 386. There was evidence 
that she edited and reviewed the content of multiple 
advertisements. At one point, she ordered the removal 
of the word “advertisement” from a set of ads. J.A. 3580. 
Co-defendant Sundin, the Chief Technology Offi cer of 
IMI and its sole shareholder and director, attested that 
Ross assumed some of his duties during his long-term 
illness. And although there was some indication that 
Ross acted in a manner suggesting that she personally 
did not perceive (or believe) that the advertisements were 
deceptive, Ross was on notice of multiple complaints about 
IMI’s advertisements, including that they would cause 
consumers to automatically download unwanted IMI 
products.
Appendix A
16a
All of this evidence paints a picture that the district 
court was wholly capable of accepting as a matter of fact: 
Ross made “countless decisions” that demonstrated her 
authority to control IMI. F.T.C. v. Bay Area Business 
Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). Although 
a different fact-finder may have come to a contrary 
conclusion from that reached by the experienced district 
judge in this case, the “rigorous” clear error standard 
requires more than a party’s simple disagreement with 
the court’s fi ndings. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of 
Charleston, LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2013).
VI
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER & JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
MARYLAND, DATED SEPTEMBER 24, 2012
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO.: RDB-08-3233
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
KRISTY ROSS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN 
OFFICER OF INNOVATIVE MARKETING, INC.,
Defendant.
September 24, 2012, Decided
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought this 
case under Sections 5(a) and 13(b) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 53(b), 
against a group of corporate entities and individuals for 
alleged deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of 
software. Specifi cally, the FTC alleged that two companies, 
Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”) and 
ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC (“ByteHosting”), 
operated as a common enterprise (the “IMI Enterprise” or 
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“Enterprise”) to conduct a massive “scareware”1 scheme 
that marketed a variety of computer security software 
via deceptive advertising. The FTC alleged that several 
of the companies’ offi cers and directors, namely, Sam 
Jain (“Jain”), Daniel Sundin (“Sundin”), Marc D’Souza 
(“D’Souza”), Kristy Ross (“Ross”), and James Reno 
(“Reno”), directed or participated in the IMI Enterprise. 
The FTC also named Maurice D’Souza, the father of Marc 
D’Souza, as a defendant in this suit. Of the original eight 
defendants, four have settled with the FTC, and three are 
in default and have had judgments entered against them 
for failure to appear and participate in this litigation. 
Defendant Kristy Ross is the only remaining defendant 
at issue.2
Jurisdiction over this case is based on the United 
States’ status as a plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and 
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. After 
a two-day bench trial from September 11 to September 
12, 2012, this Court has carefully considered the exhibits 
introduced into evidence, the testimony of the witness 
who testifi ed in person, the testimony of the witnesses 
presented by deposition, the Proposed Final Pretrial 
1.  As noted in the FTC’s Complaint, “scareware” is a common 
term that refers to a software-driven, Internet-based scheme 
that “exploits consumers’ legitimate concerns about Internet-
based threats like spyware and viruses by issuing false security 
or privacy warnings to consumers for the sole purpose of selling 
software to fi x the imagined problem.” Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1.
2.  While she has been served and has retained counsel, she 
has failed to answer and respond to any discovery requests and 
to appear for trial.
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Order, the written submissions of the parties, and the 
oral arguments of counsel. The following constitutes this 
Court’s fi ndings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant 
to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The accompanying Order enters Judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission against Defendant 
Kristy Ross individually, and as an offi cer of Innovative 
Marketing, Inc.
I.  BACKGROUND
The FTC fi led the present action on December 2, 2008 
against Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”), 
ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC (“ByteHosting”), 
Sam Jain (“Jain”), Daniel Sundin (“Sundin”), Marc 
D’Souza (“D’Souza”), Kristy Ross (“Ross”), and James 
Reno (“Reno”), and later added Maurice D’Souza as 
a defendant. After a hearing was held on December 
12, 2008, this Court entered a Preliminary Injunction 
that served to, inter alia, prohibit Defendants from 
continuing the alleged deceptive business activities, freeze 
Defendants’ assets, and compel Defendants to turn over 
certain business records to the FTC. In February 2010, 
Defendants ByteHosting Internet Services, LLC, James 
Reno, Marc D’Souza and Maurice D’Souza settled with the 
FTC. That same month, default judgments were entered 
against corporate Defendant Innovative Marketing, Inc., 
and Defendants Sam Jain and Daniel Sundin for failure 
to appear and participate in this litigation.3
3.  A criminal action was brought against Defendants Sundin, 
Jain and Reno in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois in connection with their activities with IMI. See USA 
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Ultimately, the FTC fi led a Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Defendant Ross. The sole count of 
the Complaint against her alleges that in the course 
of marketing, offering for sale, and selling computer 
software, she and her co-defendants misrepresented, 
expressly or by implication, that they had conducted 
scans of consumers’ computers and detected security 
or privacy issues, including viruses, spyware, system 
errors and pornography. The Complaint also alleges that 
since 2004 or earlier, Defendants had placed misleading 
advertisements for their software products with major 
Internet advertising networks, which serve as brokers 
that distribute advertisements to their website partners. 
The advertising networks contracted with their partners 
to display the Defendants’ advertisements across the 
Internet. After the advertising networks, such as 
MyGeek, began to receive complaints, they stopped 
v. Bjorn Daniel Sundin, Shaileshkumar P. Jain, a.k.a Sam 
Jain, and James Reno, Criminal Action No. 1:10-cr-00452. This 
case was assigned to the Fugitive Calendar on June 7, 2012 with 
respect to Defendants Sundin and Jain. Additionally, two other 
actions are presently pending against Defendant Jain. First, he 
is charged with Failure to Appear After Pre-Trial Release in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in a case 
where he was charged with Criminal Copyright Infringement, 
Traffi cking in Counterfeit Goods, as well as Mail and Wire Fraud. 
See USA v. Shaleshkumar Jain, a/k/a/ Sam Jain, Criminal Action 
No. EXE-09-00137. Second, he was indicted on May 20, 2010 in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for 
International and Domestic Money Laundering with respect to a 
number of internet-based companies, including IMI, owned and 
operated by him. See USA v. Shaileshkumar Jain, a/k/a Sam Jain, 
Criminal Action No. NRB-10-00442.
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accepting Defendants’ advertisements. At that point, 
in 2007, Defendants began creating a number of sham 
Internet advertising agencies that duped advertising 
networks and commercial websites into accepting their 
misleading advertisements. Toward this end, Defendants 
falsely represented that they were authorized to place 
advertisements, and they used sophisticated program 
coding that concealed the exploitative nature of the 
ads in order to gain approval for distribution from the 
advertising networks. Once distributed and placed on 
popular Internet sites, the exploitative content of the 
ads was revealed to many of the consumers, who were 
thereupon redirected to the Defendants’ websites that 
operated the bogus scans.
In her opposition to the FTC’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendant Ross argued that she was merely an 
employee and not a “control person” at the company, she 
did not have the requisite knowledge of the misconduct 
at issue, and as a result she bore no individually liability 
under the Act. On June 11, 2012, this Court denied the 
FTC’s Motion for Summary Judgment and noted that 
despite the FTC’s substantial evidence, it was unable, 
at this stage of the litigation, to conclusively determine 
“whether the FTC was entitled to summary judgment 
against Kristy Ross because to do so would require [it] 
to make credibility fi ndings, inferences, and fi ndings of 
fact that are more properly made in the context of a bench 
trial.” (Mem. Op. at 8, ECF No. 227). However, the Court 
held that there was no genuine issue of material fact that 
Ms. Ross’s co-defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC 
Act by making misrepresentations to consumers through 
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Internet-based ads and software-generated reports that 
induced consumers to purchase their computer security 
products. (Mem. Op. & Order, ECF Nos. 227 & 228; Ltr. 
Order, ECF No. 229).
Accordingly, a bench trial was scheduled. Prior to 
trial, this Court found that the total amount of consumer 
injury calculated by the FTC --$163,167,539.95-- was a 
proper measure for consumer redress in this case. (ECF 
No. 246).4 Additionally, this Court issued a ruling in 
which it granted Defendant Ross’s Motion in Limine to 
Preclude Application of an Adverse Inference because of 
her assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. (ECF 
No. 254). Pursuant to the same order, this Court denied 
Defendant Ross’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Hearsay 
(ECF No. 241). In this motion, Defendant Ross sought to 
exclude the out-of-court statements and documents made 
in connection with the lawsuit in Canada (“Canadian 
Litigation”) in which Ms. Ross’s co-defendants sued each 
other over the profi ts of IMI, the business at the center 
of the present case. This Court held these statements and 
documents admissible under Rule 807 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. Specifi cally, this Court determined that the 
statements were made by Innovative Marketing’s high-
ranking executives, and although they were not subject 
to cross-examination, they were made in anticipation 
4.  This Order also denied Defendant Ross’s Motion in 
Limine in support of calling Scott Ellis as an expert witness 
(ECF No. 236). Having already determined that IMI was engaged 
in deceptive marketing, this Court found Mr. Ellis’s opinion 
that advertisements placed by Ms. Ross were neither false nor 
deceptive to be irrelevant. (Mem. Order at 4, ECF No. 246).
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that they would be evaluated and challenged in a court of 
law. Moreover, the Court concluded that the challenged 
evidence was offered as evidence of a material fact and was 
more probative than other evidence that could reasonably 
be obtained as it related to the scope and nature of the 
alleged conspiracy, and served to illustrate a major 
element of the trial in this case--namely, the role Ms. Ross 
played while working at Innovative Marketing. (Mem. 
Op. at 5, ECF No. 254). As a result, the precise issues 
remaining in this case concerned the extent of Defendant 
Ross’s control over or participation in IMI’s deceptive 
marketing practices, and her knowledge of these practices.
On September 11 and 12, 2012, a bench trial was held, 
and Defendant Ross was tried in absentia. Consistent with 
its prior rulings, this Court has not applied an adverse 
inference against Defendant Ross for electing not to 
appear at trial and for asserting her Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. During trial, the FTC 
called one witness: Bhaskar Ballapragada, president of 
AdOn Network, an advertising network formally known 
as MyGeek. The Defendant did not call any witnesses, 
but each party entered large volumes of documents into 
evidence.
This Court, having considered the evidence presented 
at trial and having reviewed the parties’ pre-trial 
submissions, finds that Defendant Kristy Ross had 
authority to control the deceptive practices or acts of 
Innovating Marketing and that she participated directly in 
these deceptive practices. Additionally, the FTC has shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Ross 
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had knowledge of the deceptive practices of Innovative 
Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”) or that alternatively she clearly 
acted with reckless indifference and intentionally avoided 
the truth. As a result, Kristy Ross is individually liable for 
IMI’s unlawful practices and judgment shall be entered 
in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
against her. The FTC shall be awarded injunctive relief 
and monetary relief in the form of consumer redress 
and disgorgement. Specifi cally, Defendant Ross shall be 
permanently restrained and enjoined from the marketing 
and sale of computer security software and software that 
interferes with consumers’ computer use as well as from 
engaging in any form of deceptive marketing. Defendant 
Ross shall also be jointly and severally liable with the 
co-Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain 
and Daniel Sundin for the consumer redress amount of 
$163,167,539.95.
II.  FINDINGS OF FACT
1.  Formation of Innovative Marketing, Inc. 
(“IMI”) & the Canadian Litigation
In November 2001, Defendant Daniel Sundin 
(“Sundin”) started a business which he incorporated, 
in July 2002, as Innovative Marketing, Inc. (“IMI”)5 
pursuant to the laws of Belize and with its headquarters 
in Ukraine. The aim of the business was to develop and 
market online consumer products on an international 
5.  It is important to note that the Defendants also used the 
name Globedat to refer to IMI.
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platform. In early 2002, Defendants Sam Jain (“Jain”) 
and Kristy Ross (“Ross”) were exploring new e-commerce 
opportunities for investment and collaboration. At the 
time, Ms. Ross was romantically involved with Mr. Jain 
and had previously held positions in companies held by 
him. In April 2002, Ms. Ross introduced Mr. Sundin, 
whom she had known since September 2000 through other 
business acquaintances, to Mr. Jain. Ms. Ross and Mr. 
Jain were interested in joining forces with Mr. Sundin as 
they perceived IMI to have “tremendous growth potential 
. . . [but] felt it lacked the marketing expertise that [Ross 
and Jain] would be able to bring to the venture.” Jain Aff., 
Pl.’s Ex. 27 at 328, ¶ 3. After several meetings, Mr. Jain 
and Mr. Sundin both agreed to participate in this new 
business venture and to take lead roles in it. While the 
partnership agreement was never reduced to a writing, 
it was understood that Defendants Jain, Sundin and Ross 
would share in the profi ts of the business. Both Jain and 
Sundin recognized that Ms. Ross had valuable marketing 
expertise and while her percentage of the profi ts was to be 
smaller than theirs, there was no disagreement that she 
would be entitled to certain percentages of IMI’s profi ts. 
Sundin Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 453-54, ¶ 7; Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 
27 at 330, ¶ 14 & at 402, 471-72; Marc D’Souza Aff., Pl.’s 
Ex. 24 at 146.
Upon joining IMI, Mr. Jain brought a number of 
employees with him. Defendant Marc D’Souza (“D’Souza”) 
was one of these employees. Mr. D’Souza worked as a sales 
and marketing consultant to secure lucrative advertising 
and media buying deals and had been trained by Ms. Ross 
and Mr. Jain. At the time that IMI was being formed, Mr. 
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D’Souza was renegotiating his contract with Mr. Jain. The 
fi nalized negotiations were then proposed to Mr. Sundin 
who did not object. According to these terms, Mr. D’Souza 
was to receive “1% of the company’s profi ts up to $200,000 
a month and 20% of the company’s profi ts in excess of 
$200,000 per month.” Sundin Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 454, ¶ 
8; Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 27 at 330-32, ¶¶ 13-23. Again, this 
agreement was not reduced to a writing, but a partnership 
was formed between Defendants Jain, Sundin, D’Souza 
and Ross whereby each individual would receive a share of 
the profi ts of IMI. The shares were apparently not equal as 
Jain and Sundin had made initial monetary contributions 
to the business which Ross and D’Souza had not. As of 
2002 and until 2008, IMI was formed and engaged in the 
business of selling web-based software such as antivirus 
software, anti-spyware software and registry cleaners 
which were marketed through IMI-owned and maintained 
websites. At trial the parties agreed that IMI was a 
corporation which grew to employ over six hundred (600) 
employees over several countries including, among others, 
the United States, Argentina, India and Ukraine.
On December 29, 2006, Mr. D’Souza contacted 
Ms. Ross, Mr. Jain and Mr. Sundin on behalf of Web 
Integrated Net Solutions, Inc. to inform them of the 
termination of their joint venture. Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 27 at 
475-78. In January of 2007, Mr. D’Souza again contacted 
Defendants Jain, Sundin and Ross to inform them of 
the termination of approximately forty (40) advertising 
contracts. Id. at 479. Later that year, Defendants Jain, 
Sundin and D’Souza were involved in a lawsuit in Canada 
(the “Canadian Litigation”), in which Defendants Jain and 
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Sundin sought to recover $48 million which Defendant 
D’Souza had allegedly embezzled from IMI. While Ms. 
Ross was neither named in that litigation nor included 
in the Settlement Agreement, she was the only other 
person, apart from Defendants Jain, Sundin and D’Souza, 
to submit an affi davit in the case. Ross Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 20; 
Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Ex. 2. Mr. D’Souza also 
made an attempt to settle the case by giving Ms. Ross, 
Mr. Jain and Mr. Sundin percentages of the business. In 
response to that proposal, Mr. Jain stated that “it was 
‘extortion for you [Marc] to hold hostage money belonging 
to me, Daniel & Kristy so as to force us to make a deal 
with you.” Jain Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 27 ¶ 43. During the bench 
trial, Ms. Ross’s counsel sought to explain her involvement 
in the Canadian Litigation by stating that at the time Ms. 
Ross had been romantically involved with Mr. D’Souza 
since 2006, and he had confi ded in her that he intended 
to “run off with the money.” Bench Trial, Sept. 11, 2012, 
ECF No. 255. Despite the best efforts of her counsel, Ms. 
Ross has presented no evidence to that effect nor is her 
lawyer’s argument evidence in this case.
2.  The IMI Deceptive Marketing Scheme
This Court has previously held that the conduct 
in this case violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act as a result of representations being 
made to consumers through Internet-based ads and 
software-generated reports that induced consumers to 
purchase their computer security products. (Mem. Op. 
& Order, ECF Nos. 227 & 228; Ltr. Order, ECF No. 
229). Specifi cally, the Defendants -both corporate and 
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individual- developed a series of software advertisements, 
in the form of popups and warnings, purporting to 
discover malicious software (“malware”) on consumers’ 
computers and provide a “cure” at a cost ranging from $30 
to $100, depending on the software involved. Essentially, 
these deceptive advertisements, some of which included 
sham “system scans,” had the effect of convincing internet 
users that their computers contained malicious software, 
“illegal” pornography, or critical system errors, and 
that to fi x these problems they needed the Defendants’ 
repair software. The repair software sold by IMI 
included WinFixer, WinAntiVirus, WinAntiVvirusPro, 
W i n A nt i Spy wa re ,  Popupg ua rd ,  W i n F i rewa l l , 
InternetAntispy, WinPopupguard, ComputerShield, 
WinAntispy, PCsupercharger, ErrorSafe, SysProtect, 
DriveCleaner, SystemDoctor and ErrorProtector. 
However, both the advertisements and the repair software 
were deceptive. In fact, the number of errors found on any 
given computer was pre-determined by the Defendants. 
Moreover, the Defendants sold scareware as these repair 
products did not in fact repair or clean consumers’ 
computers. As a result, more than one million consumers 
purchased Defendants’ products, and approximately three 
thousand customers fi led complaints with the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”).6 Consumer Compls., Pl.’s 
Ex. 40. Moreover, every major computer security vendor 
considered these products to be system threats.
6.  In addition, the FTC submitted fi fty-three (53) sworn 
customer declarations detailing consumer interactions with forty-
seven (47) of Defendants’ products. Consumer Decls., Pl.’s Ex. 39.
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3.  Defendant Kristy Ross’s Role at IMI
Having already determined that a deceptive marketing 
scheme existed, the remaining issue before this Court 
and addressed at the bench trial was the extent to which 
Defendant Ross was involved in this marketing scam and 
could be held responsible. After conducting a signifi cant 
investigation into the IMI deceptive marketing scheme, 
Federal Trade Commission investigator Sheryl Drexler, 
now known as Sheryl Novick, specifi cally identifi ed Ms. 
Ross as one of the “individuals [ ] responsible for the 
scheme.” Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 3.
Defendant Ross worked at Innovative Marketing, 
Inc. from 2002 to 2008. She was in charge of business 
expansion, sales and marketing, as well as product 
optimization. Although IMI did not use formal titles until 
late 2005, from 2006 to 2008 she essentially performed the 
same functions but held the position of Vice President of 
Business Development. She also intermittently replaced 
Defendant Sundin as Chief Operating Offi cer and Chief 
Technology Offi cer from 2004 to 2007. She assumed these 
roles because Mr. Sundin was suffering from bacterial 
overgrowth syndrome and because he considered her 
“to be a savvy manager and technically knowledgeable 
in [his] areas of computer software and design as well as 
marketing skills.” Sundin Aff., Pl.’s Ex. 21 ¶ 15. Moreover, 
at times she had access to his email account and was 
carbon copied on all emails sent to him. See, e.g., Chat 
Log, Def.’s Ex. 9A; see also Email, Def.’s Ex. 3.
Appendix B
30a
As part of her duties, Ms. Ross often approved and 
requested payment for expenses incurred by IMI, and on 
several occasions, used her personal credit card to pay for 
certain advertising and operating expenses. Specifi cally, 
she was one of seven people to approve expenses at IMI. 
Additionally, she was in charge of reorganizing IMI’s 
operational structure and dealt with accounting, hiring 
and IMI product issues. Notably, a chat log7 reveals that 
she and Defendants Jain and Sundin were to fi nalize 
the “todos [sic]” for the company reorganization prior to 
their distribution to the managers. Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 
3A at 365. In the same chat log, she instructs “James”8 to 
provide her with a problem-solving matrix which would 
contribute to the reorganization of certain departments. 
Id. Another chat log indicates that on several occasions 
she attended meetings with a major venture capital fi rm 
interested in doing business with IMI. Chat Log, Def.’s 
Ex. No. 11A at 3. Furthermore, the bulk of the IMI chat 
logs reveal that Ms. Ross routinely made executive-type 
decisions, demanding that employees fi x problems and 
follow company procedures, and delegating IMI business 
projects. See generally Chat Logs, Def.’s Exs. 1A - 16A. 
Ms. Ross even threatened to fi ne an entire department 
if it did not complete a project on schedule. Chat Log, 
7.  The parties have stipulated to the fact that Ms. Ross’s 
username in the chat logs was “fuzzy.” Prop. Final Pretrial Order 
at 15, ¶ 8, ECF No. 239.
8.  The parties agree that “James” in the chat logs refers to 
James Reno, one of the former Defendants in this case who settled 
with the FTC. As noted, Reno was indicted in Criminal Action No. 
1-10-cr-00452 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois. See supra n. 3.
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Def.’s Ex. 1A at 323; see also Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 7A. 
Additionally, she often demanded and obtained reports 
on web traffi c, sales numbers, and click-through response 
rates for IMI’s products and advertising campaigns. She 
also participated in strategic discussions regarding IMI’s 
future, was actively involved in the daily operations of 
the company and had the authority to set prices for IMI’s 
products. See, e.g., Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 14A.
With respect to the deceptive ads, Ms. Ross used 
her expertise in marketing and personally approved, 
developed, wrote, altered, reviewed, and contributed to a 
large number of them. In fact, she dictated the appearance 
and style of certain ads, suggested which words should or 
should not be included and how certain sentences should 
be translated, as well as decided the level of aggression to 
consumers that these ads should present. See, e.g., Chat 
Log, Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 326; Chat Log, Pl.’s Ex. 2 at 351; Chat 
Log, Def.’s Ex. 1A at 322, 326, 331; Chat Log, Def.’s Ex 
2A at 348, 351-52. On two occasions, Ms. Ross instructed 
ad developers to remove advertising disclaimers which 
would have indicated to consumers that these popups or 
warnings were mere advertisements as opposed to real 
scanners. See, e.g., Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 2A at 352. In the 
company’s chat logs, Ross is observed directing employees 
to make ads more aggressive because “aggression zero 
doesn’t [sic] give sales.” Chat Log, Def.’s Ex. 2A at 350. In 
another instance, she specifi cally instructs the developers 
to “add aggression” to certain creatives. Chat Log, Def.’s 
Ex. 2A at 347.
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In October 2004, Ross opened fi fty-four (54) individual 
password-protected accounts with MyGeek, an internet 
advertising company which would later become known 
as AdOn. She used these accounts until 2007 to place 
advertisements in the form of Flash ads9 for IMI 
products including Winfi xer, DriveCleaner, FreeRepair, 
WinAntivirus, WinAntispyware, System Doctor and 
others. These ads reached customers over 600 million 
times. She personally funded the advertisements placed 
at MyGeek for up to approximately $23,000 and then used 
Marc D’Souza and Daniel Sundin’s credit cards as well 
as wire transfers from IMI’s account to place additional 
advertisements. Pl.’s Ex. 35; Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex 1, 
¶¶ 106, 111. “In total, Kristy Ross placed $3.3 million of 
advertisements for Defendants’ products with MyGeek.” 
Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 111. Ms. Ross also possessed 
a password-protected account at ValueClick which allowed 
her to use ValueClick’s adserver, Mediaplex, to store ads 
which were disseminated though the MyGeek ad network.
As the direct contact at IMI for MyGeek, Ms. Ross 
interacted daily with the MyGeek account manager, Geoff 
Gieron. Specifi cally, Mr. Gieron would get in touch with her 
when publishers and other ad networks complained about 
the Defendants’ advertisements. In attempts to resolve the 
problems, publishers would contact MyGeek, who would 
in turn contact Ms. Ross, by forwarding screenshots of 
9.  “A Flash object is a binary fi le that can contain multiple 
graphics and logic to animate those graphics. The fi le can then 
be opened by a Flash player plug-in within a consumer’s browser 
much like a word document can be opened in Microsoft Word.” 
Prop. Final Pretrial Order at 28, ¶ 22.
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the problems and asking for an immediate fi x. Ms. Ross 
was repeatedly informed that these ads violated company 
policy as they included download software without content. 
See, e.g., Drexler Decl., Def.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 115-117. Accordingly, 
Ms. Ross routinely communicated with MyGeek regarding 
complaints that the company received pertaining to IMI 
ads, and approved and edited the contents of ads placed on 
the MyGeek network, but the problems continued to occur. 
Id. In one instance, MyGeek contacted Ms. Ross about a 
specifi c DryCleaner advertisement containing a popup 
window which read “DriveCleaner found 948 Dangerous 
Files in your system. Get rid of them?” Gieron Dep., Pl.’s 
Ex. 55 at 318. Upon reviewing this advertisement, Ms. 
Ross responded “This is not a popup, it is fl ash in the 
website . . . this is an example of the scanner . . . This is 
certainly not a popup or Active x.” Id. at 36, lines 140:1 
- 140:18.
Accordingly, Ms. Ross was aware that these 
advertisements purported to do more than they actually 
did. Additionally, other chat log conversations involving 
Ms. Ross indicate that she was aware that the ads were 
“unpleasant” and that she knew that IMI’s advertising 
was causing problems, including low customer retention 
and even lawsuits. See, e.g., Chat Log, Pl.’s Ex. 11 at 3. 
On March 29, 2007, MyGeek terminated its relationship 
with IMI by informing Ms. Ross that it “’will no longer 
be running ads from any advertiser that sell products in 
the area of spyware, antivirus, registry cleaner, system 
doctor, evidence eraser and the like’ because their 
relationships with ‘traffi c partners have been threatened 
and we just can’t afford the risk any longer.’” Drexler 
Decl., Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 118.
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III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The FTC has brought the present action under 
sections 5(a) and 13 of the FTC Act. Section 5(a) of 
the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), prohibits engaging in 
“[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.” Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes the 
FTC to seek injunctive relief for section 5 violations. To 
succeed under section 5(a), the FTC must prove (1) that 
there was a representation; (2) that the representation was 
likely to mislead consumers; and (3) that the misleading 
representation was material. See FTC v. Tashman, 318 
F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003).
Having established liability for Defendant IMI, 
Defendant Ross may be held individually liable upon a 
showing by the FTC that she “participated directly in 
the practices or acts or had authority to control them.” 
FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th 
Cir. 1989); see also, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’n., 
Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Publ’g 
Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997). 
“Authority to control the company can be evidenced by 
active involvement in business affairs and the making 
of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of 
a corporate offi cer.” Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 573. In 
addition, the FTC must show that Defendant Ross had 
some knowledge of the violative conduct. See Publishing 
Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1170 (noting that corporate 
individuals are liable if they “had knowledge that the 
corporation or one of its agents engaged in dishonest or 
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fraudulent conduct, that the misrepresentations were 
the type which a reasonable and prudent person would 
rely, and that consumer injury resulted”). In this regard 
the FTC need not make a showing of “intent per se” 
-- instead the knowledge requirement may be “fulfi lled 
by showing that the individual had ‘actual knowledge 
of material misrepresentations, reckless indifference 
to the truth or falsity of such misrepresentations, or an 
awareness of a high probability of fraud along with an 
intentional avoidance of the truth.’” Amy Travel, 875 
F.2d at 574 (quoting FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 
F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Minn. 1985)); see also FTC v. 
Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 311 (D. 
Mass. 2008) (noting that the FTC must prove “that the 
individual defendants either knew or should have known 
about the deceptive practices, but it is not required to 
prove subjective intent to defraud”).
It has been Defendant Ross’s position that she should 
not be held individually liable because the FTC has not 
satisfi ed its burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she either had authority to control or directly 
participated in the deceptive acts. Moreover, Defendant 
contends that the FTC failed to demonstrate that she 
knew of the IMI deceptive marketing scheme. At trial, 
Defendant’s counsel made much of the fact that at the 
time of the formation of IMI, Ms. Ross was a twenty-two-
year-old woman romantically involved with one of the main 
partners of IMI. Her counsel further explained that she 
was not a corporate offi cer but that she held a position 
of favor due to her status as Mr. Jain’s girlfriend. She 
contended that instead she held a type of administrative 
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assistant’s role, facilitated employee relations because 
she was kinder and easier to work with than Defendant 
Jain, and stepped up when necessary to help out when 
Mr. Sundin became too ill to fulfi ll his responsibilities. 
Ms. Ross’s counsel repeatedly argued that she was a 
troubleshooter and introduced the idea, for the fi rst time 
at trial, that her position was not that of a Vice President 
but more that of a media buyer which is considered to be 
a lower level employee. During the brief bench trial, Ms. 
Ross’s counsel sought to paint the picture of a betrayed 
young woman who had made poor choices in both work 
and life partners.10 Once again, the argument of counsel 
is not evidence in this case in which Ms. Ross not only 
failed to respond to any discovery request but declined 
to appear for trial.11
1. Ms. Ross’s Authority to Control or Her Direct 
Participation in the Deceptive Acts
To secure individual liability under the FTC Act, 
there must be a showing of participation or control in 
an enterprise’s unlawful activity, which in turn may 
be indicated by an individual’s assumption of duties as 
a corporate offi cer, involvement in business affairs, or 
10.  Ms. Ross was romantically involved with both Defendants 
Jain and D’Souza at different times during the deceptive 
marketing scheme.
11.  While this Court does not apply any adverse inference 
against Ms. Ross for her assertion of her Fifth Amendment 
privilege, her counsel cannot offer testimony on her behalf. The 
creative argument of counsel is not evidence in a case.
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role in the development of corporate policies. See Publ’g 
Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171; Amy Travel, 875 F.2d 
at 573; FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1117 (S.D. 
Cal. 2008); FTC v. Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. 
Supp. 2d 1167, 1207-08 (N.D. Ga. 2008); FTC v. Wilcox, 
926 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 1995). On the one hand, 
authority to control is also evidenced by an individual’s 
ability to review and approve advertisements as well as 
his or her ability to issue checks, make hiring decisions 
and personally fi nance or pay for corporate expenses. See 
Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1293; FTC v. USA 
Financial, 415 Fed. Appx. 970, 2011 WL 679430, at * 3 
(11th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Stefanchik, No. C04-1852RSM, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25173, 2007 WL 1058579, at * 6-7 
(W. D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2007). The FTC need not show that 
the Defendant was the Chief Executive Offi cer (“CEO”) 
of a company to demonstrate authority to control, active 
involvement in the affairs of the business and the deceptive 
scheme is suffi cient. See Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. 
Supp. at 1293; FTC v. J.K. Publ’ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 
1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000).12
On the other hand, direct participation can be 
demonstrated through evidence that the defendant 
12.  Defendant argued that the “control person” standard 
enunciated in Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 
2001) should be applied. However, that case involved the “control” 
standard enunciated in Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“SEC Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). As the FTC correctly 
argued, the SEC Act’s control standard is not applicable in FTC 
Act cases where FTC precedent is controlling and applies a 
different “control” standard.
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developed or created, reviewed, altered and disseminated 
the deceptive marketing materials. See FTC v. Direct 
Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 310-11 (D. Mass. 
2008); Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d at 
1207-08; Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1293; J.K. 
Publ’ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; FTC v. Am. Standard 
Credit Sys., 874 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Active 
supervision of employees as well as the review of sales and 
marketing reports related to the deceptive scheme is also 
demonstrative of direct participation. See Wilcox, 926 F. 
Supp. at 1104; FTC v. Consumer Alliance, No. 02-C-2429, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17423, 2003 WL 22287364, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2003).
Although the FTC is only required to prove (a) that 
Ms. Ross had authority to control or (b) that she directly 
participated in the deceptive acts, the evidence in this 
case demonstrates that Defendant Ross had both the 
authority to control the deceptive acts within the meaning 
of the Section 5 of the FTC Act and that she directly 
participated in said acts. Although not explicitly labeled as 
a controlling shareholder or partner of IMI, the evidence 
reveals that Ms. Ross was an original founder of the 
company and was known by all three of the other main 
offi cers of the company as someone who would receive 
and who received shares of the profi ts. As far as IMI 
is concerned, none of the partnership agreements were 
reduced to a writing but Mr. D’Souza sent letters in late 
2006 terminating the Joint Venture between himself, as 
a representative of Web Integrated Net Solutions, Inc., 
Mr. Jain, Mr. Sundin and notably Ms. Ross. Moreover, Ms. 
Ross herself identifi ed herself as the IMI Vice President of 
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Business Development and stated that she was responsible 
for business expansion, sales and marketing, as well as 
product optimization. Nowhere did she state that she 
was a media buyer. While she argued that her corporate 
title was meaningless because IMI did not operate 
under traditional corporate formalities, her role with the 
company, her adoption of Defendants Jain and Sundin’s 
affi davits in the Canadian Litigation and the plethora of 
evidence in emails and chat logs indicate that she was a 
control person at IMI.
Out of the six hundred employees, Ms. Ross has been 
shown to be one of the founders, one of seven people to 
approve expenses, one of the four to receive percentages 
of the profi ts of IMI, and one of the main individuals 
to appear in a managerial role in chat logs, emails and 
advertising contracts. Furthermore, in her affi davit, Ms. 
Drexler, now known as Ms. Novick, explicitly identifi ed 
Ms. Ross as one of the individuals responsible for the 
deceptive marketing scheme at IMI. As such, the FTC 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Ms. Ross had authority to control the deceptive marketing 
scheme at IMI.
Arguendo, even if Ms. Ross had not had authority to 
control the deceptive acts at IMI, compelling evidence 
establishes that she directly participated in the deceptive 
marketing scheme. First, her interactions with the staff 
and the developers indicate that she not only controlled 
the contents and appearance of the ads, but that she also 
reprimanded and disciplined departments when the work 
did not coincide with her standards. Her co-defendants 
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even acknowledged that they partnered with her because 
of her marketing expertise. Secondly, the chat logs also 
establish that she was involved in key company decisions 
such as partnership arrangements (e.g., Sundin and a major 
U.S. venture capital fi rm), how to reorganize the company 
and whom to hire. Furthermore, she also had access to 
company accounts and approved corporate expenses. 
On several occasions she even opened advertising 
accounts using her own personal credit card. While her 
counsel argued at trial that she only personally spent 
approximately $23,000 on accounts with MyGeek of the 
$3.3 million spent, Ross did not submit any evidence that 
other IMI employees funded those accounts. Moreover, the 
Drexler affi davit specifi cally states that “[t]o place these 
advertisements with MyGeek, she used credit cards in the 
name of “M D” (which [Ms. Drexler] believe[d] to be Marc 
D’Souza . . .), “Daniel Sundin,” and wire transfers from 
IMI’s account.” Drexler Aff., Def.’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 106. The 
FTC’s evidence demonstrates that Ms. Ross was not just 
a staff member but that she supervised the ad developers, 
made changes and gave orders concerning the ads, and 
funded the dissemination of these ads, whether through 
her own personal account or other accounts such as those 
of IMI, Daniel Sundin and Marc D’Souza. As such, Ms. 
Ross directly participated in the deceptive marketing 
scheme.
Accordingly, Ms. Ross’s broad responsibilities at 
IMI coupled with the fact that she personally fi nanced 
corporate expenses, oversaw a large amount of employees 
and had a hand in the creation and dissemination of the 
deceptive ads proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
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that she had authority to control and directly participated 
in the deceptive acts within the meaning of Section 5 of 
the FTC Act.
2.  Knowledge
As mentioned previously, Defendant Ross contends 
that even if she is found to have had authority to control 
or directly participated in the deceptive acts, she did not 
know of the deceptive marketing scheme. To establish 
individual liability under section 5(a) the FTC must also 
establish that an individual defendant had some knowledge 
of the unlawful conduct. As previously mentioned, the 
knowledge requirement may be “fulfi lled by showing 
that the individual had ‘actual knowledge of material 
misrepresentations, reckless indifference to the truth or 
falsity of such misrepresentations, or an awareness of a high 
probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of 
the truth.’” Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574 (quoting FTC v. 
Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D. Minn. 
1985)); see also FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 
F. Supp. 2d 285, 311 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that the FTC 
must prove “that the individual defendants either knew or 
should have known about the deceptive practices, but it is 
not required to prove subjective intent to defraud.”). “[T]
he degree of participation in business affairs is probative 
of knowledge.” Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574.
Courts have held that defendants have knowledge 
of the deceptive marketing scheme where they “wrote 
or reviewed many of the scripts that were found to be 
deceptive and [where] they were undoubtedly aware of 
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the avalanche of consumer complaints.” Id. at 575; see 
also FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC, No. C00-1806L, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25565, 2002 WL 32060289, at * 5 (W.D. 
Wash. 2002) (“There is ample evidence in the record 
that defendant Eisenberg was directly involved in the 
development of the deceptive marketing scheme . . . that 
he reviewed at least some of the solicitation forms before 
they were mailed, that he knew very few subscribers used 
the internet services for which they were being billed, and 
that he was aware that some of the consumers . . . did not 
realize they had contracted for internet services.”). In 
FTC v. Direct Marketing Inc., two defendants were held 
to be “at least willfully blind or recklessly indifferent to 
the deceptive” scheme because one was a co-owner of 
the company, and attended managerial meetings where 
he heard concerns about the product; and the other had 
a controlling position at the corporation and “procured 
placement” for the deceptive advertisements. 569 F. Supp. 
2d 285, 311 (D. Mass. 2008). In FTC v. J.K. Publications, 
Inc., involving credit card fraud scheme, the defendant’s 
wife was held to be individually liable because her actions 
demonstrated intentional avoidance of the truth and 
reckless indifference. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). She was a corporate offi cer of the company, had 
fi ve years of experience as a bank teller and loan offi cer, 
was aware of her husband’s criminal past, and personally 
signed for purchases and opened bank accounts used to 
perpetrate the deceptive acts. Id. at 1206-07. Moreover, 
the court made note of the fact that she accepted the large 
sums of money her husband brought into the household 
despite knowing that his previous business ventures were 
unsuccessful. Id. Conversely, the wife of the defendant in 
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FTC v. QT, Inc., a case which involved the marketing of 
a bracelet which falsely purported to cure arthritis, was 
not determined to have had knowledge of the deceptive 
scheme because she was only listed as a corporate 
secretary and her responsibilities “did not include the 
marketing of the Q-Ray bracelet or anything pertaining to 
the marketing of the Q-Ray bracelet.” 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 
973 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Accordingly, when an individual (1) 
had some level of participation in the development, review, 
creation or editing of the deceptive marketing scheme, 
(2) disseminated the deceptive advertisements, and (3) 
was aware of complaints or problems surrounding the 
marketed product or the advertisements, while he or she 
may not necessarily have actual knowledge of the unlawful 
acts, this individual is at best recklessly indifferent to the 
truth or intentionally avoids it.
At trial, Ms. Ross’s counsel repeatedly argued that 
Ms. Ross was duped by Defendants Jain, D’Souza and 
Sundin. There is no evidence in this case to support this 
argument, and once again counsel cannot testify for her 
client. Another contention was that, unlike Mr. Jain and 
Mr. Sundin, she used her real personal information when 
opening accounts and that someone seeking to deceive 
would have used false identifi ers. She also argued that 
some of the chat logs indicated that, if anything, she 
actually believed IMI was a legitimate company that 
provided “sound products” to its customers.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this case 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. 
Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive marketing 
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scheme. She wrote, edited, reviewed and participated 
in the development of multiple advertisements. She 
instructed developers to make the advertisements more 
aggressive and on at least two occasions ordered them 
to remove the term “advertisement” from certain ads. 
She funded the accounts through which the ads were 
disseminated to consumers. She was fully aware of the 
many complaints from consumers and ad networks and 
was in charge of remedying the problems. Moreover, 
she had the marketing expertise and was trusted by her 
partners because of that expertise.
Even if Ms. Ross, despite exercising signifi cant control 
over the advertisements, had not had actual knowledge 
of their deceptive nature, the facts demonstrate that she 
was at the very least recklessly indifferent or intentionally 
avoided the truth. First, she was romantically involved 
with Defendant Jain since before the creation of IMI. 
Later on, in 2006, she became romantically involved with 
Defendant D’Souza and submitted an affi davit against him 
in the Canadian Litigation. Additionally, she had access to 
Defendant Sundin’s email when she covered for him while 
he was dealing with his illness.
Second, the evidence demonstrates that she received 
shares of the business’s profi ts and made large sums 
of money from it. Third, she received and was aware 
of the numerous consumer and ad network complaints. 
Notably, she knew that complaints concerned the fact that 
the advertisements purported to scan but that the ads 
themselves were not supposed to scan. She also knew that 
the ads were “unpleasant” and that customer retention 
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was low. She purported to fi x the problem, but the problem 
continued to occur and she continued to receive complaints. 
Additionally, MyGeek terminated the relationship with 
IMI by informing her that her advertisements were 
threatening MyGeek’s reputation. Moreover, she actively 
participated in making the advertisements unpleasant and 
instructed her developers to increase their aggression 
level. Finally, she requested that the term “advertisement” 
be removed from certain ads thereby further contributing 
to the deception of customers. Consequently, the FTC has 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. 
Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive marketing 
scheme. Alternatively, her involvement with IMI and her 
participation in the deceptive marketing scheme as well 
as her awareness of consumer complaints demonstrate 
that she acted with reckless indifference and intentionally 
avoided the truth. As such, she is individually liable for 
the deceptive acts of IMI, and judgment shall be entered 
in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).
3. Injunctive and Monetary Relief
Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, “in proper 
cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, 
the court may issue a permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 53(b). This Court has previously held that “[t]he authority 
to grant such relief includes the power to grant any 
ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice, 
including ordering equitable relief for consumer redress 
through the repayment of money, restitution, rescission, 
or disgorgement of unjust enrichment.” FTC v. Ameridebt, 
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (D. Md. 2005) (citing FTC 
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v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997)). “To insure 
that any fi nal relief is complete and meaningful, the court 
may also order any necessary temporary or preliminary 
relief, such as an asset freeze.” Ameridebt, 373 F. Supp. 
2d at 562 (citing FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 
469 (11th Cir. 1996)). The court therefore possesses broad 
equitable authority which it must particularly exercise to 
protect the public interest. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 
328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S. Ct. 1086, 90 L. Ed. 1332 (1946) 
(citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S. Ct. 
587, 88 L. Ed. 754 (1944)). “Permanent injunctive relief 
is appropriate when there is ‘some cognizable danger of 
recurring violation.’” FTC v. Medical Billers Network, 
Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). To make 
this determination a court can consider the following 
factors: “the defendants’ scienter, whether the conduct was 
isolated or recurrent, whether defendants are positioned 
to commit future violations, the degree of consumer harm 
caused by defendants, defendants’ recognition of their 
culpability, and the sincerity of defendants’ assurances 
(if any) against future violations.” Id. (citing FTC v. 
Minuteman Press, 53 F. Supp. 2d 248, 260-61 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998)). “Moreover, the egregious nature of past violations 
is a factor supporting the need for permanent injunctive 
relief of a broad nature.” Kitco of Nevada, 612 F. Supp. 
at 1296. Finally, the injunction must not “unduly harm 
the defendants . . . [by] put[ing] them out of business, but 
[must] simply ensure that they will conduct their business 
in a manner which does not violate Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.” Id.
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In this case, the FTC seeks to permanently restrain 
and enjoin Ms. Ross from the marketing and sale of 
computer security software and software that interferes 
with consumers’ computer use as well as from engaging 
in any form of deceptive marketing. Ms. Ross is found to 
be responsible for the deceptive marketing scheme at IMI 
which affected a large number of online consumers and 
led to the fi ling of three thousand consumer complaints 
with the FTC. The scheme generated large sums of 
money, a portion of which went to Ms. Ross. Her expertise 
in marketing was touted by her partners and used to 
deceive and defraud a large number of consumers. As 
such, a permanent injunction prohibiting Ms. Ross from 
marketing computer security software and software that 
interferes with consumers’ computer use is appropriate. 
Finally, this permanent injunction does not in any way 
harm her or deprive her of other employment opportunities. 
She may still utilize her marketing talents as long as they 
are used for legitimate products and ventures and do not 
contribute to deceiving the public.
As far as consumer redress is concerned, “[t]he power 
to grant ancillary relief includes the power to order 
repayment of money for consumer redress as restitution 
or recession.” Febre, 128 F.3d at 534; see also Ameridebt, 
373 F. Supp. 2d at 563. As a permanent injunction can be 
imposed on Ms. Ross she may also be liable for monetary 
damages. Medical Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 
at 324. In order to obtain restitution under Section 13(b), 
however, the FTC must establish that “(1) the business 
entity made material misrepresentations likely to deceive 
consumers, (2) those misrepresentations were widely 
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disseminated, and (3) consumers purchased the entity’s 
products.” FTC v. Free Commc’n, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 
1206 (10th Cir. 2005). “The proper measure of consumer 
restitution is the amount that will restore the victims 
to the status quo ante, not what defendants received as 
profi t.” FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC, et al., No. C00-
1906L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25565, 2002 WL 32060289, 
at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2002). Specifi cally, “allowing a damages 
determination based on gross receipts in a case arising 
directly under the FTC Act furthers the FTC’s ability to 
carry out its statutory purpose.” FTC v. Kuykendall, 371 
F.3d 745, 765-66 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Febre, 128 F.3d 
535-36. As such the amount of consumer redress is the 
amount paid by consumers for the Defendants’ products 
minus any refunds. Additionally, under section 13(b) a 
court may order disgorgement of a defendant’s “unjust 
enrichment” when it is not possible to reimburse all of 
the consumers who have been injured by the defendant’s 
misrepresentations. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 
466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 
33 F.3d 1088, 1103 n. 34 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083, 
115 S. Ct. 1794, 131 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1995). Once the FTC 
has satisfi ed its burden, it is up to the defendant to show 
that the calculations are not accurate. FTC v. QT, Inc., 
448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
In this case, the FTC has satisfi ed its burden to show 
that the Defendants made material misrepresentations 
which were likely to deceive, that those misrepresentations 
affected a large number of consumers and that more than 
one million consumers bought Defendants’ products. The 
FTC correctly notes that if Defendant Ross is found to be 
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individually liable for the deceptive scheme, she is jointly 
and severally liable for the consumer redress amount of 
$163,167,539.95 calculated by the FTC.13 Defendant Ross 
argued, however, that this sum was grossly overinfl ated 
and that she should only be held liable for the ads and 
products she herself marketed at MyGeek. Specifi cally, 
counsel for Defendant Ross noted that “the FTC cannot 
disgorge from an individual defendant net revenue 
received by the Enterprise before or after the defendant 
directly participated in, or had authority to control, the 
deception.” FTC v. Wash. Data Res., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56233, at *86 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 
2012). In response, the FTC has correctly noted that Ms. 
Ross had the opportunity to present fi nancial information 
and to respond to discovery but has failed to do so.
It is well established that once a defendant is found 
to be individually liable for a corporate defendant’s 
deceptive acts, he or she is jointly and severally liable for 
the total amount of consumer redress. See, e.g., FTC v. 
J.K. Publ’ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC 
v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 
1985). Ms. Ross participated and had authority to control 
the advertising scheme from its inception until it was 
13.  According to the FTC, this amount was calculated based 
on Defendants’ profi t and loss statements for 2004-2006, and 
Defendants’ payment processor records for 2006-2007. Proposed 
Final Pre-Trial Order at 22, ECF No. 239. Moreover, the FTC 
has repeatedly stated that this amount represents a ceiling for 
monetary recovery and this Court has previously held that this 
amount was a reasonable approximation of the damages in this 
case.
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interrupted by the FTC. Moreover, Ms. Ross was at least 
recklessly indifferent to or intentionally avoided the truth 
when it came to the deceptive marketing scheme, and the 
FTC satisfi ed its burden with respect to the imposition of 
consumer redress. Defendant Ross had suffi cient time to 
challenge the amount of recovery proposed by the FTC 
by proposing her own calculation and amount but failed 
to do so. Having previously determined that the amount 
calculated by the FTC was a reasonable approximation of 
consumer redress, this Court fi nds that Defendant Ross 
is jointly and severally liable for $163,167,539.95 in this 
case. Accordingly, Defendant Ross shall be permanently 
restrained and enjoined from the marketing and sale of 
computer security software and software that interferes 
with consumers’ computer use as well as from engaging 
in any form of deceptive marketing. Defendant Ross shall 
also be jointly and severally liable with co-Defendants 
Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain and Daniel Sundin 
for the consumer redress amount of $163,167,539.95.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission 
against Defendant Kristy Ross, individually and as 
an offi cer of Innovative Marketing, Inc. on all Counts 
contained in the FTC Complaint. Defendant Ross shall be 
permanently restrained and enjoined from the marketing 
and sale of computer security software and software 
that interferes with consumers’ computer use as well 
as from engaging in any form of deceptive marketing. 
Defendant Ross shall also be jointly and severally liable 
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with co-Defendants Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain 
and Daniel Sundin for the consumer redress amount of 
$163,167,539.95.
A separate Order and Judgment follows.
Dated: September 24, 2012
/s/    
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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ORDER & JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum 
Opinion, this 24th day of September 2012, it is HEREBY 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
1. That Judgment is entered in favor of 
Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
against Defendant Kristy Ross, individually 
and as an offi cer of Innovative Marketing, Inc. 
on all Counts contained in the FTC Complaint;
2. That Defendant Kristy Ross shall be 
permanently restrained and enjoined from 
the marketing and sale of computer security 
software and software that interferes with 
consumers’ computer use as well as from 
engaging in any form of deceptive marketing;
3. That Defendant Ross shall be jointly 
and severally liable with the co-Defendants 
Innovative Marketing, Inc., Sam Jain and 
Daniel Sundin for the consumer redress amount 
of $163,167,539.95;
4. That any and all prior rulings made by 
the Court disposing of any claims against any 
parties are incorporated by reference therein, 
and this Order shall be deemed to be a fi nal 
Judgment within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 58;
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5. That the Clerk of the Court transmit copies 
of this Order and accompanying Memorandum 
Opinion to counsel for the parties; and
6. That the Clerk of the Court CLOSE 
THIS CASE.
/s/    
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX C — STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Year Consumer 
Protection 
Federal 
Actions Filed
Reported Total Amount of 
Redress and Disgorgement 
Ordered in Judgments 
(in millions of dollars)
2013 43 $297
2012 62 741.5
20111 43 223.7
2010 38 368
2009 83 393
2008 64 371.2
Totals 333 $2,393.7
Source: http://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/
ftc-annual-reports
1. 2008 to 2011 reports include the data range of March of the 
named year to February of the next year.  Starting with 2012, the 
FTC reports calendar year statistics.  The 2012 row likely includes 
results that were already included in the 2011 row: any data within 
the date range January 1 to February 29, 2012.
